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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CATHY F. CRAWFORD, SHERRY
MORGAN, and DALE HANSEN,
Petitioners,
vs.

|i BRIEF OF PETITIONER
]| SHERRY MORGAN
]
]|

Case No. 930589-CA

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS j 5 CSRB 45 (Step 6)
and the CAREER SERVICE REVIEW
]| 8 CSRB/H.O. 119 (Step 5)
BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
]
Respondents.

i Priority 14.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER MORGAN

APPEAL FROM THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE CAREER
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, CASE NUMBER 8 CSRB/H.O. 119 (Step 5), 5
CSRB 45 (Step 6).

I.
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as amended) confers
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court or other appellate Courts, as
provided by statute, to review all final agency actions resulting
1

from formal adjudicative proceedings.

Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-

3(2)(a) (1953, as amended) and Rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure grant jurisdiction to the Utah Court of
Appeals to review the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of State agencies.

This appeal

is from a formal adjudicative proceeding conducted by the Career
Service Review Board, a statutorily created and state funded
administrative agency.
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.

Does the Department of Corrections have a duty to

implement and enforce the policies issued by the Department of
Human Resource Management (herein State Personnel)?
Standard of Review:

This issue is one of general law and is to

be analyzed for correctness with no deference given the agency's
decision.

SEMECO Indus.. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d

1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting).
2.

Does the Department of Corrections have a duty to treat

its employees, including Petitioner Morgan, with consistency and
fairness such that inequitable and unjust circumstances do not
arise regarding the pay levels of departmental employees?
Standard of Review:

This issue is one of general law and is to
2

be analyzed for correctness with no deference given the agency's
decision.
3.

Id.

Did the Career Service Review Board err in holding that

the Department of Corrections had treated Petitioner Morgan
fairly and justly regarding her pay despite the fact that
Petitioner Morgan proved that a newly hired employee (with less
combined directly-related education and experience) was paid a
higher salary than Petitioner Morgan?
Standard of Review:

This issue is one of an abuse of discretion

and is to reviewed on an intermediate standard of whether it is
reasonable and rational.

Id.
III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are applicable to the case
on appeal and each of the following are set forth in the text of
Argument hereinafter (pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of
Appellant Procedure):
a.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-2(2).

b.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-2(3).

c.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-2(6).

d.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-5.

e.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-6(1)(i).
3

f.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-6(1)(d).

g-

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-8.

h.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-9.

i. Utah Code Annotated 67-19-12(3)(b).
j-

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-12(4)(b).

k.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-30(2).

1.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19a-101(5).

m.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19a-301(3).

n.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19a-302(l).

o.

Utah Administrative Code R468-2-2 (1990).

P-

Utah Administrative Code R468-2-3 (1990).

q-

Utah Administrative Code R468-7-3(2) (1989).

r.

Utah Administrative Code R468-7-3(2) (1990).

s.

Utah Administrative Code R477-7-3(2) (1993).
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. CASE NATURE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION

This is a grievance filed by a career service employee of
the State of Utah.

Petitioner Morgan filed her grievance in July

of 1990, asserting an injustice involving her wages and salary.
The grievance was denied at all levels of internal review by the
Department of Corrections.
4

Petitioner Morgan then appeared before a duly appointed
Hearing Officer, Garth L. Mangum.

Mr. Mangum noted the disparity

between Petitioner Morgan's pay and that of Scott Pepper but
concluded that a $0.47 per hour difference was not sufficient to
warrant a change in Petitioner's salary.

Petitioner appealed to

the Career Service Review Board (herein CSRB), which affirmed on
the ground that Petitioner had not carried her burden of proving
a pay inequity.
Petitioner appeals from the decision of the Step 5 Hearing
Officer and the Career Service Review Board denying her
grievance.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

All citations are to the Findings of Fact (F.F.) rendered by
the Career Service Review Board in the Step 6 Decision.

A copy

of that Decision is set forth in the Addendum.
Sherry Morgan has been an employee of the State of Utah for
over twenty (20) years.

F.F. 18. Prior to working for the

Department of Corrections, she worked in what was then known as
the Department of Social Services for just over seven (7) years.
Id.

When Sherry filed her grievance in this matter, she was

employed with the Department of Corrections as an Adult Probation
& Parole agent.

At the time of the grievance, she had worked

with the Department as an Adult Probation & Parole agent for
5

thirteen (13) years and ten (10) months, and was occupying a
Grade 23 position and being paid at the rate of $13.34 per hour.
F.F. 21, 22.

She earned a Bachelor of Science degree in

Sociology prior to becoming employed with the Department.
18.

F.F.

Sherry therefore claims to have seventeen (17) years ten

(10) months combined education and experience.
Sherry's principal grievance is that her circumstances
(i.e., education and experience) warrant that she should be
treated like a similarly situated employee.
is Scott Pepper.

That employee's name

Mr. Pepper was hired in 1989 as a Grade 23

Adult Probation & Parole agent.

F.F. 38. At the time of the

grievance, Mr. Pepper had seventeen (17) years of related
experience but no related educational background.

F.F. 39. Mr.

Pepper was being paid at the rate of $13.81 per hour at the time
of the grievance.

F.F. 38.
V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I;

Public policy requires fair and consistent

treatment of all state employees.

To achieve that end, State

Personnel is required to administer the pay plan so that state
agencies comply with the Utah State Personnel Management Act
(herein USPM Act) and State Personnel rules and policies.

State

Personnel has adopted administrative rules mandating that state
6

agencies comply with State Personnel rule and policies.

State

agencies are therefore bound to comply with the USPM Act and
State Personnel rules and policies.
POINT II: By requiring state agencies to treat employees
fairly and consistently, the Legislature intended that state
employees had the right to challenge any injustice or oppression
involving his/her wages and salary.

In broad statutory language,

the Legislature granted state employees the right to file
grievances involving such injustices.

Thus, the fact that State

Personnel does not have an administrative rule directly on point
does not preclude state employees from grieving injustices
regarding their wages and salaries.

Further, since State

Personnel and the Career Service Review Board (herein CSRB) have
recognized the concept of pay inequity, Petitioner Morgan can
validly challenge an injustice regarding her salary on a theory
of pay inequity.
POINT III:

Sherry Morgan has seventeen (17) years and ten

(10) months of education and experience that is directly related
to the position of Adult Probation & Parole Agent, Grade 23.
That education and experience exceeds that of a co-worker, Scott
Pepper, who had seventeen (17) years and zero (0) months of
directly related experience.

Since Mr. Pepper's pay exceeded

that of Petitioner Morgan by $0.47 per hour, that pay
7

differential constitutes a pay inequity that should be remedied
by this Court,
VI.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS REQUIRED TO
COMPLY WITH THE POLICIES ADOPTED BY STATE
PERSONNEL.
Public employees are charged with the obligation of
performing their duties in an efficient and fair manner
consistent with the public trust bestowed upon them.

To that

end, the Legislature recognized that public employees can best
perform their duties if the employees are shielded from the
vagaries of politics.

The Legislature thus enacted the Utah

State Personnel Management Act, U.C.A. 67-19-1, et seq., (1979,
as amended) (herein USPM Act).

The USPM Act contains seven (7)

declarations of policy, of which three (3) declarations are
pertinent to the case at bar:
"(2) It is the policy of this state that the
Utah state personnel system be administered
on behalf of the governor by a strong central
personnel agency. Any delegation of
personnel functions should be according to
standards and guidelines determined by the
central personnel agency and should be
carefully monitored by it.
(3) It is the policy of this state that
comparative merit or achievement govern the
selection and advancement of employees in
8

Utah state government and that employees be
rewarded for performance in a manner that
will encourage excellence and strengthen the
system.
(6) It is the policy of this state to ensure
its employees opportunities for satisfying
careers and fair treatment based on the value
of each employee's services." U.C.A. 67-19-2
(1979, as amended). (Emphasis supplied).
In order to implement the foregoing policies, the
Legislature created a department, known as the Department of
Human Resource Management (herein State Personnel), to administer
and implement the USPM Act.
amended).

See U.C.A. 67-19-5 (1979, as

The Legislature specified that State Personnel would

be administered through a Director who is appointed by the
Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Id.

The

Legislature also imposed numerous statutory duties upon the
Director, which include, inter alia, the development of "a statewide program of personnel management that will; ... foster
careers in public service for qualified employees; ..."
67-19-6(1)(i).

U.C.A.

Finally, the Legislature intended for State

Personnel to perform an oversight function as to state agencies
in certain specified areas.

Such an intent arises by virtue of

the fact that certain functions of State Personnel are
statutorily prohibited from being delegated to state agencies:
"The following functions shall be performed
by the department and may not be contracted
or otherwise delegated to another state
9

agency:
(1) the design and administration of
the state pay plan;
(2) the design and administration of
the state classification system and
procedures for determining schedule
assignments;
(3) position classification studies,
including periodic desk audits, except that
an agency may conduct classification studies
and desk audits as necessary under Subsection
67-19-9(2) consistent with a delegation
agreement approved by the department;
(4) maintenance of registers and
certification of eligible applicants;
(5) the monitoring of state agency
personnel practices to determine compliance
with state personnel guidelines, including
equal opportunity and affirmative action; and
(6) the maintenance of central
personnel records. U.C.A. 67-19-8 (1989).
(Emphasis supplied).
In order to implement the foregoing broad statutory
provisions, the Legislature gave the Director of State Personnel
statutory authority to adopt rules pursuant to the Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
as amended).

See U.C.A. 67-19-6(1) (d) (1979,

In accomplishing the task of promulgating rules,

the Director adopted the following rule (as it applied at the
time of the grievance herein) governing the role of State
Personnel:
"As staff support to the Governor, the
10

purpose of the Department of Human Resource
Management is to facilitate improvement in
the management of human resources and to
provide professional personnel services to
state and local government which emphasize
human dignity. The department is responsible
for the following:
(1) Establishment of. and monitoring
compliance with, statewide policies, rules,
standards and procedures governing employment
with the State of Utah.
(2) Technical assistance, coordination
and support of personnel activity in agencies
having their own personnel management
resources.
(3) Comprehensive personnel support of
those agencies which do not have their own
personnel management resources.
(4) Final approval of all personnel
actions taken by agencies." (Emphasis
supplied). R468-2-2, Utah Administrative
Code 1990.
Furthermore, the Director mandated, by rule, that state
agencies have a legal obligation to comply with the USPM Act and
rules adopted by the Director:
"Individuals are employed by the State of
Utah but directed in their assignments by
agencies, which agencies have the
responsibility to manage their own human
resources in compliance with these rules,
reserving the ability and authority to
correct administrative errors.
(1) The Executive director, DHRM, may
authorize special exceptions to provisions of
these rules when permitted by law and when
justified by unique and compelling
circumstances in an agency consistent with

11

R468-2-2.
(2) Agency personnel records,
practices, policies and procedures are
subject to fact finding audit by the DHRM.
(3) In accordance with section 67-1913(2) UCA, no new employee shall be hired in
a state position covered by this statute, and
no employee shall be changed in pay, title or
status, nor shall any employee be paid unless
certified by the Executive Director, DHRM, as
eligible under the provisions of or rules
promulgated according to this act.
(4) In cases of serious noncompliance
with the State Personnel Management Act, 6719 UCA, and the rules contained herein, the
Executive Director, DHRM, may find the
responsible agency official to be subject to
the penalties prescribed by section 67-1918(1) UCA pertaining to misfeasance,
malfeasance or nonfeasance in office.
(Emphasis supplied). R468-2-3, Utah
Administrative Code 1990.
The foregoing statutes and rules unequivocally prescribe
that the Department of Corrections is duty bound and required to
comply with all State Personnel rules, standards, guidelines, and
policies.

Moreover, since State Personnel cannot delegate the

administration of the pay plan, Petitioner Morgan respectfully
submits that the Department of Corrections has only that
authority to implement and administer compensation levels of
departmental employees in a fashion consistent with State
Personnel rules, standards, guidelines, and policies.

With the

foregoing principles in mind, Petitioner Morgan respectfully

12

submits that it is now appropriate to examine the state
standards, guidelines and policies regarding compensation and
what is more particularly described as a pay inequity.
II.
STATE PERSONNEL POLICIES AND THE UTAH STATE
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT REQUIRE THE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS TO TREAT EMPLOYEES
CONSISTENTLY AND FAIRLY.
Petitioner Morgan filed a grievance (along with 19 other
individuals) in July of 1990, asserting that the recent hiring of
one Randy Richins created a pay inequity such that her pay should
be adjusted to remedy this injustice.

After filing her grievance

(and through discovery of other materials), Petitioner Morgan
discovered that one Scott Pepper had been hired at a salary rate
higher than that of Petitioner Morgan.

Petitioner Morgan also

ascertained that Mr. Pepper had less directly related education
and experience than does Petitioner.

It is this unfair

discrepancy between the pay of Morgan and Mr. Pepper that
Petitioner Morgan challenged below before the Career Service
Review Board and now challenges before this Court.
The concept of a "pay inequity" is neither statutorily
defined nor defined by rule.

The Director of State Personnel,

Earl Banner, admitted, in a letter dated August 8, 1990, (a copy
of which is set forth in the Addendum), however, that such a
circumstance does exist:
13

"The definition of an inequity is an
injustice or unfairness as it relates to
employees1 compensation. An inequity as it
relates to salaries of employees in the same
classification would be evidenced by
difference salaries paid to different
employees when other variables are the same
or equal. Variables to consider are
education, experience, hire dates/rates,
performance ratings, merit increase amounts,
etc." (R. 132, Grievant Exhibit 10).
(Emphasis supplied).
Mr. Banner also specified that "agencies have the
responsibility to be consistent in their treatment of employees"
and "in instances of identified inconsistency, there may, in
fact, be unfair or unjust treatment."

Mr. Banner further

proscribed the methodology for determining whether an inequity
exists:
"The actual salary on the range is dependent
on a great number of variables. The
variables justify different salary rates for
people in the same classification and salary
range. Only when the variables are the same,
but salaries are different, does an inequity
exist." (R. 133, Grievant Exhibit 10).
(Emphasis supplied).
Prior to writing his letter of August 8, 1990, Mr. Banner
also issued (to all state agencies), a document entitled "DHRM
Bulletin - Subject Hiring up to mid point of salary range" (a
copy of which is set forth in the Addendum).

In this Bulletin,

Mr. Banner required all state agencies to submit requests for
special salary adjustments when the hiring of a new employee
14

creates what he describes as a "pay inequity condition." Mr.
Banner further mandated that "potential inequities are to be
identified, studies and resolved before being created."

It is

thus firmly established that State Personnel recognized the
concept of pay inequity when Petitioner Morgan filed her
grievance in July of 1990.
Further, that State Personnel has not adopted formal rules
or regulations regarding pay inequities is not fatal to
Petitioner Morgan's claim inasmuch as there is significant
statutory authority in the USPM Act and elsewhere to support a
claim for pay inequity.

U.C.A. 67-19-12(3)(b) (1988) requires

that classification of positions occurs in a fashion such that
"the same schedule of pay may be applied equitably to all
positions in the same class." U.C.A. 67-19-12(4) (b) also
requires State Personnel to design pay plans to achieve "equal
pay for equal work."

The USPM Act expresses the Legislature's

intent to treat employees on the basis of "comparative merit" and
for the provisions of the USPM Act to be implemented and
interpreted so that employees receive "fair treatment based on
the value of each employee's services."
(6);

See U.C.A. 67-19-2(3) &

see, also, Phillips v. General Services Admin., 917 F.2d

1297, 1298 (Fed. Circ. 1990) (merit system principles can be used
to interpret personnel statutes and rules);
15

accord, Alaska

Public Employees Ass'n v. State, 831 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1992).
Petitioner Morgan respectfully submits that "equitable
application" of a "schedule of pay" when combined with the
concepts of "equal pay for equal work" justifiably supports the
State Personnel policy that an injustice regarding employees1
compensation is remediable.

To hold otherwise would ignore

Legislative intent because you would not be treating employees
based on comparative merit (U.C.A. 67-19-2(3));

you would not be

giving an employee fair treatment based on his/her services
(U.C.A. 67-19-2(6);

and you would not be implementing a

statewide personnel program that fosters careers in public
service.
The USPM Act also contains broad and all-encompassing
language regarding the scope of a grievance that can be filed by
an employee:
"All grievances based upon a claim or charge
of injustice or oppression, including
dismissal from employment, resulting from an
act, occurrence, commission, or condition
shall be governed by Title 67, Chapter 19a,
Grievance and Appeal Procedures, and Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act." U.C.A. 67-19-30(2) (1992). (Emphasis
supplied).
The provisions of Title 67, Chapter 19a, Grievance and
Appeal Procedures, also permits an employee to file a grievance
based "upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression ...,"
16

see U.C.A. 67-19a-301(3) (1979), and broadly defines the term
grievance:
"(5) 'Grievance1 means:
(a)
a complaint by a career service
employee concerning any matter touching upon
the relationship between the employee and his
employer; and
(b) any dispute between a career
service employee and his employer," U.C.A.
67-19a-101(5) (1991). (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, the Grievance and Appeal provisions specifically
permit an employee to file a grievance concerning any issue
involving wages or salary.

See U.C.A. 67-19a-302(1).

Petitioner

Morgan therefore submits that State Personnelfs policy of
recognizing pay inequities is justified.
Prior to July of 1990, State Personnel had also specified,
by administrative rule, that pay inequities should be prevented:
"Individuals will typically be hired at the
minimum of the approved range. However,
agencies have full responsibility and
authority to hire up to midpoint of the
approved range. The department head is
responsible for providing funding and for
preventing inequities as determined by agency
management." R468-7-3(2).
The Director of State Personnel changed R468-7-3(2) in 1990,
however, to provide:
"Individuals will typically be appointed at a
minimum pay of the approved range. However,
agencies have full responsibility and
authority at their discretion to hire up to
17

midpoint of the approved range. Hiring above
the minimum of the range shall not be used as
justification to increase the salary of
current incumbents except where approved
market date supports such increases." (4687-3(2) (1990).
The 1990 change was motivated not by an intent to eliminate
the concept of pay inequity but to limit abuse by various state
agencies:
"A. I can give you some background on why it
was changed, because some departments could
easily create what may be termed an inequity
by hiring people, say, five percent above the
minimum of the entry range who had equal or
less education experience than current
incumbents who were being paid at the entry
level and had not advanced on the range
because of the many merit freezes and lack of
merit increases the State has suffered for
the last five years.
And so one way, from a department head
perspective, I guess, to advance or increase
everybody's salary would be to intentionally
create an inequity by hiring someone, as I
indicated, five or ten percent higher than
minimum and then saying, Oops, we've got to
solve this problem by moving all of these
more senior and more qualified people who are
being paid less, and they would have to be
moved equal to or higher than the new hire to
correct or solve the inequity.
So there was some attempt to prohibit
that kind of practice in the mind of the
executive director. I'm not sure this new
wording was that successful in addressing the
problem. That was the reason." (R. 394,
lines 1-22).
Mr. McDonald (Director of Compensation for State Personnel)
18

acknowledged, however, that departments were required under the
1990 version of R468-7-3(2) to prevent inequities by studying the
situation prior to hiring a new employee.

(R.398, lines 15-21).

Mr. McDonald also acknowledged that state agencies were required
to seek special salary adjustments when pay inequity
circumstances arise.

(R.414, lines 1-8). Significantly, the

current version of R468-7-3(2) is found in R477-7-3(2) and
contains an absolute prohibition against hiring a new employee at
a salary higher than an incumbent:
"Individuals will typically be appointed at
step one (1) of the approved salary range.
No salary offer to a new hire shall be made
if it exceeds the salary rate of any current
incumbent, equally qualified, in the same job
classification and salary range of the new
hire and in the same division of the agency.
Exceptions will require written justification
from the department head and approval from
DHRM. No offers of appointment shall exceed
step eight (8) on the general classified and
data processing pay plans, and step six (6)
on the trade and craft pay plan, unless
approved as an exception by the Director,
DHRM." R477-7-3(2) (1993). (Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioner Morgan thus submits that state administrative
rules and policies mandate that the Department of Corrections
treat Petitioner Morgan consistently and fairly by preventing
and/or correcting a pay inequity circumstance.
Finally, Petitioner Morgan submits there exists decisions of
the Career Service Review Board and case law from other states
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which support the concept of a pay inequity.

In C. C. Patel v.

Div. of Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991), the CSRB was
faced with a situation in which Mr. Patel (an Engineer Level IV)
was being paid less than a newly hired Engineer III. Mr. Patel
grieved the matter and his grievance was denied because the state
agency had not been able to hire an Engineer III at any lower pay
level than that given to the new hire.

The CSRB acknowledged,

however, that its role was to adjudicate disputes concerning
salary and wages:
"Inasmuch as the State's compensation system
has been set up by the Legislature to compare
its "comparability of state salaries to wages
and salaries paid by private enterprise and
other public employment for similar work"
(67-19-12(4)(b)(ii), it is not unreasonable
to believe that some stresses and strains
will result on occasion concerning salary
comparisons between certain employees. That,
however, is why this Board exists; to review
and adjudicate those matters brought through
the grievance procedure, including disputes
and complaints anent salary and wages."
Patel. at 12. (Emphasis supplied).
In John H. Jones v. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 4 CSRB 38
(1992), Mr. Jones filed a grievance asserting that he had been
denied a five percent (5%) pay increase that had been granted to
other similarly situated employees.

The CSRB affirmed the Step 5

Hearing Officer's granting of Mr. Jones' grievance.

In so doing,

the CSRB acknowledged the Legislature's intent to treat employees
fairly:
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"The State expects that merit and achievement
will determine the advancement of its
employees, and that employees will be
properly rewarded with a salary and benefits
that encourages excellence amidst a fair
employment system (67-19-2(3)). To hold
Jones unfairly to his Grade 21 Trooper II pay
rate while concomitantly placing him at the
duties and responsibilities of a Grade 23,
when the other seven troopers received a five
percent increase for their advancement to
Grade 23 but which he did not, is not an
acceptable merit system practice. Such
unfairness and disparate treatment require
redress for Agent Jones. Id.f at 20.
(Emphasis supplied).
Lastly, Petitioner Morgan submits that the decision of
Thoresen v. Dept. of State Civil Service. 433 So.2d 184 (La. App.
1st Circ. 1983) is supportive authority for the proposition that
pay inequities are to be remedied.

In Thoresen, a group of

employees (that were classified as Engineer Specialists)
challenged a pay plan that differentiated between their
classifications and that of Engineers.

The Engineer Specialists

claimed they were performing the same work as Engineers and
should be compensated likewise.

The Appellate Court agreed and

stated that "[It] is a fundamental notion that employees who
perform equal work should receive equal pay."

Id., at 195.

Persuasively, this "equal pay" concept is identical to the
statutory language found in the USPM Act (see U.C.A. 67-1912(4)(b)(i)) and further supports Petitioner Morgan's claim that
a pay inequity claim is justifiable and warranted.
21

In summary, the concepts of inequity and injustice are
firmly embodied in the USPM Act;
practices and policies;
Review Board;

in State Personnel rules,

in decisions of the Career Service

and in decisions from other jurisdictions.

This

Court should therefore acknowledge that justice can only be
served by rectifying pay inequities in public employment.

We now

term to an analysis of this case.
III.
THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS VIOLATED STATE
PERSONNEL POLICIES AND STATUTORY MANDATES BY
UNFAIRLY AND UNJUSTLY CREATING A PAY INEQUITY
CIRCUMSTANCE REGARDING PETITIONER MORGAN AND
THE CSRB ERRED BY FAILING TO ORDER THE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS TO CORRECT THE
INJUSTICE.
Sherry Morgan had been employed with the State of Utah for
twenty one (21) years at the time she filed her grievance in July
of 1990.

During her first seven (7) years, she worked for the

former Department of Social Services.

Sherry's remaining

thirteen (13) years and ten (10) months of employment were in the
position of Adult Probation & Parole agent with the Department of
Corrections.

Sherry also holds a Bachelor of Science degree in

the directly related field of Sociology, and was earning $13.34
per hour at the time of the grievance herein.
Sherry's grievance is predicated on comparing her
circumstances, as set forth above, with those of a newly hired
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Adult Probation & Parole agent, Scott Pepper.

Mr. Pepper had

seventeen (17) years of directly related experience to the
position of Adult Probation & Parole agent.

Mr. Pepper does hold

a bachelor's degree but his degree is in a field unrelated to the
position of an Adult Probation & Parole agent.
The Step 5 Hearing Officer determined that Mr. Pepper had
greater experience than Sherry and therefore precluded Sherry
from prevailing on her grievance.

The Hearing Officer

acknowledged, however, that Sherry's combined education and
experience exceeded that of Mr. Pepper but concluded that the
Department of Corrections did not have to consider directly
related education in determining salary.

Sherry appealed to the

full body of the Career Service Review Board and the CSRB
affirmed:
"UDC considered, evaluated, and credited
educational background for purposes of
qualifying persons to meet DHRM's "minimum
qualifications" (MQs) for AP&P Agent
positions. The Department was not required
by law (neither by statutory provision nor
administrative rule), or by UDC's own
policies and procedures, to credit equally
years of educational experience along with
directly related work experience for purposes
of salary setting. The three Appellants have
not shown a violation of any statutory
provision, administrative rule or promulgated
policy or procedure in the comparables'
hiring process. Appellants have failed to
meet their burden of proof of showing any
direct, actionable, unreasonable, or
unjustified inequity, including any personnel
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rule violation, even with timeliness
questions aside." Conclusion of Law Number
28, Step 6 Decision, at 18.
The CSRB erred in making the foregoing conclusion because it
simply ignored the "DHRM Bulletin" dated July 1, 1990, which
specifies that "inequities are created when a newly hired
employee is paid more than a current incumbent."
set forth in the Addendum).

(See Exhibit 9,

Further, that Bulletin specifies the

reasons that can justify a difference in pay between a new hire
and an incumbent:
"1) Higher education credentials
2) More total employment experience
applicable to the position
3) Low performance ratings that may have
restricted the pay level of the current
employee(s)." R.131 - See Exhibit 9 set
forth in the Addendum.
Despite this clear mandate, the Hearing Officer and the CSRB
believe the Department of Corrections has the authority to simply
ignore Sherry's directly related educational credentials!
Moreover, the Hearing Officer and the CSRB also ignored the
opinion of the Director of State Personnel who opined, in his
letter of August 8, 1990, that:
"The actual salary on the range is dependent
on a great number of variables. The
variables justify different salary rates for
people in the same classification and salary
range. Only when the variables are the same,
but salaries are different, does an inequity
exist." R.133.
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The Hearing Officer and the CSRB lastly ignored the
testimony of Dick McDonald (the person in charge of compensation
for State Personnel) who opined that comparing a "new hire" with
an incumbent requires consideration of the individuals'
respective educational credentials:
"Q. I mean, if I was a new hire, or if
someone is newly hired with a rate equal to
mine or above mine, does that automatically
meant that someone could get a salary
increase?
A. It's not automatic. You would have to
consider all of the other criteria,
variables, such as their education and
experience." R.387, lines 13-19.
Despite the foregoing policies and guidelines adopted by
State Personnel, the CSRB asserts the Department of Corrections
has authority to determine whether education credentials are
relevant to assessing pay inequity!

Such an assertion is

astonishing when considered in light of the specific authority
granted to state agencies under the USPM Act:
"State agencies shall be responsible for the
following personnel functions:
(1) initial job descriptions;
(2) recommending position
classifications and grade allocations;
(3) selecting qualified applicants for
appointment and promotion to vacant
positions;
(4) conducting performance evaluations;
(5) disciplining employees; and
(6) maintaining individual personnel
records." U.C.A. 67-19-9
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Nowhere in the above-quoted statute is the Department of
Corrections granted authority to deviate from the compensation
policies adopted by State Personnel.

In fact, the USPM Act

clearly mandates that State Personnel, and only State Personnel,
shall design and administer the pay plan for state employees.
U.C.A. 67-19-8(1) (1989).

The Department of Corrections thus has

only that authority (concerning pay issues) granted to it by
State Personnel pursuant to rules and policies.

State personnel

policies (those embodied in the DHRM Bulletin and Mr. Banner's
opinion) do not permit an agency to ignore educational
credentials in assessing a pay inequity situation.

The CSRB,

like the Department of Corrections, ignored State Personnel
policies and procedures and its decision cannot stand.
A most interesting facet of the CSRB's decision in this case
is its reliance on allegations that Petitioner Morgan did not
show a violation of statute or rule.

The CSRB's Conclusion of

Law Number 28 hereinabove states as much.

The conclusion is at

odds, however, with the CSRB's analysis in Jones v. Dept. of
Public Safety, supra., a copy of which is set forth in the
Addendum hereto.
In Jones, the CSRB determined that Trooper Jones was
entitled to be treated like all other similarly situated
employees by receiving a five percent (5%) pay raise incident to
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a transfer.

In ruling in Trooper Jones' favor, the CSRB made the

following pertinent conclusions of law:
"(5) The Board concludes as a matter of law
that the Department made an erroneous
decision that precluded a special pay
increase for Agent Jones. The Department is
obligated to treat all similarly situated
employees alike, unless there is a reasonable
or rational purpose in making an exception.
In the instant case, no rules or statutes
precluded Agent Jones from receiving the
special pay adjustment that was granted to
the other seven selected troopers for UDI
service....
(9) On its face, this salary difference in
the treatment accorded Jones and the seven
other similarly situated troopers/agents
constitutes an impermissible, unfair
employment practice within the State's civil
service system. Jones was not treated fairly
nor equitably vis-a-vis the other troopers/
agents when he was advanced to Grade 23
without receiving the pay rate increase
awarded to his seven UHP peers." Jones v.
Dept. of Public Safety, at 16, 17. (Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioner Morgan asserts the underpinnings of the Jones
decision do not rest upon Trooper Jones proof that the Department
of Public Safety violated any rule but rather on whether he was
treated fairly and consistently with other similarly situated
employees.

Sherry Morgan sought the same treatment before the

CSRB - that she be treated with the same dignity, equity and
fairness contemplated by the USPM Act and State Personnel.

The

CSRB did not follow Jones and therefore failed to follow its own
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decisions in deciding the case at bar.
In summary, it is undisputed that Sherry Morgan's combined
education and experience exceeds that of the newly hired
employee.

It is undisputed that the pay differential ($0.47 per

hour) between Sherry Morgan's pay and that of the "new hire" is
not de minimis inasmuch as the differential is equivalent to a
different pay step between Sherry and Mr. Pepper.

It is

therefore incumbent upon this Tribunal to rectify the injustice
being perpetuated upon Sherry Morgan.

The Department of

Corrections does not have unfettered discretion to treat
employees in any manner it chooses to do so.

This Court should

send a message to state agencies that it cannot trample on longtime employees by treating them in such a patently unfair and
unjust manner.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the decision of the Career Service
Review Board and grant Sherry Morgan's request for a salary
increase, together with back pay to the date of the filing of the
grievance.
Dated this

/

day of

*^j^ty^i^y-

, 1994.

Respectfully submitted,

ullip w. Dyer"
k/mi/Crawford.bri/APPl

Attorney for Petitioner Morgan
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29

BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In The Matter Of:

:

CATHY CRAWFORD, et al.,
Grievant,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Agency.

DECISION AND FINAL
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

AGENCY ACTION

Case Nos. 5 CSRB 45 (Step 6)
8 CSRB/H.O. 119 (Step 5)

The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level
review of the above-captioned case on June 17, 1993. The following Board Members heard
oral argument and later deliberated in an executive session: Chairman Bruce T. Jones,
Jean M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig and Jose L. Trujillo. Cathy Crawford, Dale Hansen and
Sherry Morgan (Appellants) are a remnant group of three employees who have jointly
appealed a Step 5 Decision, which originally included 20 employees. Phillip W. Dyer,
Attorney at Law, represented Appellants on behalf of the Utah Public Employees1
Association (UPEA). Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. Schwendiman represented the
Utah Department of Corrections (Department and UDC). A certified court reporter made
a verbatim record of this proceeding, consisting mainly of oral argument before the Board,
which is commonly referred to as a Step 6 appeal hearing under the State Employees•
Grievance and Appeal Procedures.
AUTHORITY
The CSRB • s statutory authority is set forth at §§67-19a-101 through -408 of the Utah
Code Unannotated (1993 Supp.)

This case proceeded properly through the State• s grievance procedures, and the
Board has assumed jurisdiction over this appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or Board-level review
constitutes the final step in the administrative review process under the codified Grievance
and Appeal Procedures, according to §§67-19a-202(l)(a), -407, and -408, as well as
constituting a final agency action under §63-46b-14 of the Utali Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA). All the UAPA • s formal adjudicatory provisions are applicable to the CSRB • s
proceedings at both Steps 5 and 6. The Board entered into an executive session for
deliberation and decision-making, but did not conclude its deliberations until August 12,
1993, when the Board closed the case record and made an ultimate decision.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During July 1990, 20 UDC employees filed individual grievances that were
consolidated into one group grievance at Step 5 pursuant to §67-19a-401(7)(a) and R140-1-1
Definition, ("Consolidation"), Utah Administrative Code (1990 Supp.).

The CSRB

designated this case as Cathy Crawford, et aL, v. Utah Department of Corrections
("Crawford"). UPEA represented all aggrieved employees in the Crawford case in contrast
to the companion case of Michael Hansen, et aL, v. Utah Department of Corrections
(mHansenm), in which the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), Local 1009, provided counsel for a smaller group of eight aggrieved employees.
Both the Crawford and Hansen cases involved allegations of pay equity complaints by
aggrieved employees who claimed greater years of service and related job experience
compared with certain more recently hired UDC employees. The Department's Field
Operations Division employed all Grievants in both group grievances as Adult Probation
and Parole Agents (AP&P Agents) at the time these grievances were filed. The same CSRB
hearing officer heard and ruled upon both the Hansen and Crawford cases. Consequently,
the Board• s examiner made common references between both cases during their procedural
processing, as well as during the actual Step 5 evidentiary hearings of both cases, as did each
party' s counsel.
Initially, both group grievances had been combined for a joint hearing under
R140-1-1, Definition ("Joint Hearing11).

However, as case management of both the

Crawford and Hansen group grievances became unworkable on a consolidated basis due to
certain recognizable distinctions, the CSRB administrator separated the cases effective
March 8, 1991.
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Almost three years have elapsed between the time Grievants filed their statements
of grievance and the presentation of oral argument at Step 6 before this Board in the
Crawford case. The three Appellants deserve a brief explanation for this long processing
period.
Grievants filed their statements of grievance during July 1990, with the CSRB
hearing officer1 s Step 5 or evidentiary decision being issued two years later. During this
24-month period, the first appointed CSRB hearing officer conducted a prehearing
conference, issued a Prehearing Conference Order, then upon a party • s request, recused
himself based upon good cause. The second CSRB hearing officer conducted a prehearing
conference to sort out the issues, dealt with several motions to dismiss, received several
other motions on which he made rulings, requested written briefing on specific legal issues,
and entered a few interim orders (in both cases). The Step 5 hearing was noticed up with
four separate dates, along with an additional half-dozen continuances being requested and
issued. After Appellants Crawford, Hansen1 and Morgan appealed the Crawford Step 5
Decision, nearly three months passed before the evidentiary proceedings • transcript became
available to the parties. Upon access to the Step 5 proceedings' transcript volumes,
Grievants1 counsel requested and received four separate month-long extensions for
submitting his brief. Next, Agency • s counsel requested and received a single month-long
extension.

Overall, more than eight months elapsed between requesting the Step 5

proceedings' transcript and the filing of both parties' Step 6 appeal briefs.
As only three of the twenty original aggrieved employees participating in the
Crawford grievance case have perfected an appeal to Step 6 (Appellants Cathy Crawford,
Dale E. Hansen and Sherry Morgan), this Step 6 Decision is applicable only to Appellantsf
particular appeal. Thus, this decision is not directed to nor intended for any other former
Crawford case participants.
ISSUES
A. Issues Adjudicated at Step 5
The following twofold issues were noticed for the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing as the
proper issues to be adjudicated:
1.
2.

Are the grievants entitled to prevail on their respective
salary grievances?
If so, what is the appropriate remedy?
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During the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings held on June 18 and July 22-23,1992, the
CSRB hearing officer dismissed the individual cases of 9 of the 20 aggrieved employees •
cases. Next, after conducting the de novo evidentiary hearing during which all testimonial
and documentary evidence were received into the record, the CSRB trier of fact reached
an ultimate conclusion that denied all 11 remaining Grievants their requested remedy and
relief.
B. Issues Presented Upon Appeal to Step 6
Appellants' Brief asserts that the CSRB hearing officer's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decision (Step 5 Decision) is an inadequate legal decision.
Appellants have characterized their confusion over the Step 5 Decision in the following
passages:
It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue this case on appeal for
one very simple reason, to-wit: The Hearing Officer has not
made specific, detailed findings of fact which can be pointedly
addressed, refuted or supported. Instead, the Hearing Officer
has labeled his rather rambling discussion as being Findings of
Fact when, in fact, many of his findings are conclusions of law
. . . [Example omitted.] Grievants are thus prohibited from
pointing out facts that support or refute the conclusions because
no finding exists to support the conclusions . . . .
It is thus Grievants' initial position that the Step 5 Hearing
Officer has failed to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact
so as to permit this Tribunal to effectively review his analysis
and decision (Brief, pp. 1-2).
Appellants aver that the Step 5 Decision is ambiguous in its factualfindingsand legal
conclusions, and that the evidentiary decision lacks both factual sufficiency and specificity.
Therefore, they have identified the four most "pertinent issues" needing resolution.
Appellants' four pertinent issues constitute their four legal arguments at Step 6, which they
have expounded on in their Brief as follows: (1) the hearing officer committed reversible
error by not properly interpreting certain provisions of the Utah State Personnel
Management Act consonant with its policy provisions, (2) the hearing officer erred when
determining that law enforcement experience was directly related to an AP&P Agent's
position for pay equity analysis, (3) the hearing officer erred when not comparing
Appellants' salary data with all (i.e., meaning Bassi's and Benson's) of the
"comparables •" salary data presented into evidence, and (4) the hearing officer erred when
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concluding that Appellants had not been harmed by existing pay inequities. At the Step 6
proceeding, Appellants emphasized and expanded upon their first and fourth points, while
leaving the second and third points to their Brief.
C. The Board*s Appellate Standards of Review
Effective November 2, 1992, the Board amended its Standards of Review provision
at R137-1-21 D. Thus, the recently amended version of R137-1-21 D. is applicable to
Appellants' appeal to this Board-level review. The Board's review standards state:
D. The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards
of review shall be based upon the following criteria:
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and
rational in accordance with the substantial evidence standard.
If the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB
hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or
additional factual findings.
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and
rational or has corrected the factual findings based upon the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then
determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance
with the correctness standard, with no deference being granted
to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer.
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of
the CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon
the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant
policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the
above provisions.
The Board reviews this appeal based upon the above-quoted provisions.
D. Burden of Proof at Step 6
Appellants are the moving party at Step 6 and therefore shoulder both the burdens
of proof and of persuasion. To prevail, Appellants must demonstrate under the standards
set forth at R137-1-21 D., above, that reversible error is present in the Step 5 Decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Board now exercises its vested discretionary authority in making and entering
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into the case record its own findings of fact and legal conclusions, in addition to those
findings already made at the proceedings below.
A, General Findings
1. Initially, there were 20 Grievants in this pay equity group grievance. Nine
Grievants had their respective cases dismissed during the evidentiary proceedings held on
June 18, July 22-23, 1992.
2. The Step 5 Decision denied remedies to the following 11 Grievants: Karl Bartell
(Bartell), Cathy Crawford (Crawford), Patricia Dennis (Dennis), Dale E. Hansen (Hansen),
Jeffrey MacLeod

(MacLeod),

Sherry Morgan

(Morgan),

Lisa Shavers

(Shavers),

Katherine Straten (Straten), Beverly Thomas (Thomas), Paul Truelson (Truelson) and
Gerald White (White).
3. None of the just-named 11 Grievants prevailed at the Step 5 or evidentiary level.
The Step 5 Decision ultimately concluded that no salary inequities had been created when
the Department credited three former police officers with their respective years of law
enforcement experience. Nor did any of the eleven Grievants prevail when they compared
themselves with two State employees who had accepted lateral pay-rate transfers into AP&P
Agent positions frortr other State agencies.
4. All the just-named 11 Grievants were AP&P Agents within the Departments
Field Operations Division during the processing of this grievance.
5. At the grievance's filing date (July 26, 1990), the 11 Grievants' various lengths
of service time as AP&P Agents ranged from Morgan' s 13 years, 10 months down to
Truelson' s 2 years. Ten Grievants held the position of AP&P Agent, Grade 23, while only
Truelson held the position of AP&P Agent, Grade 21.
6. Crawford, Dennis, Straten, Shavers, and Thomas had the same pay rate of $11.23
at the grievance filing, while the other six had various pay rates: Morgan ($13.34),
Bartell ($14.29), Hansen ($12.47), White ($11.34), MacLeod ($11.73) and Truelson ($9.81).
7. All 11 Grievants claimed personal harm based upon the Department's filling
AP&P Agent positions either by hiring new employees or by the acceptance of current State
employees transferring into Field Operations. Grievants • specific complaint was against five
recruited AP&P Agents who had been offered salaries at pay rates above the minimum
entry levels.
8. The five newer AP&P Agent hires used as "comparables" by the three Appellants
-6-

were: William Brad Bassi (Bassi), Ronald W. Benson (Benson), Kenneth Lee Bingham
(Bingham), Scott Pepper (Pepper) and Randy Richins (Richins). All five newer AP&P
Agents had been hired (or transferred) above the minimum entry level pay rate for their
respective salary grade, whether on Grades 19, 21 or 23. These five newer agents were
designated as "comparables" during these proceedings, which term is still applicable.
B. Appellant Cathv Crawford
9. The Department hired Crawford in July 1986, as an AP&P Agent, at entry-level
Grade 17 (A-3, G-24).
10. On a yearly basis, Crawford received promotions through AP&P Agent ranks as
she advanced from Grade 17 to Grades 19, 21 and 23. Crawfordf s most recent promotion
occurred in July 1989, when she advanced to the senior working level of AP&P Agent,
Grade 23.
11. At the filing of this group grievance (July 1990), Crawford had exactly four
years • direct AP&P Agent experience. At that time, her pay rate was $11.23 per hour.
12. Crawford, at her grievance filing, had been credited with an additional three
years and two months of directly related job experience for her prior service as a
Correctional Officefwith the Salt Lake County Sheriff • s Department. Thus, along with her
four years • AP&P Agent service, Crawford • s total directly related job experience for both
AP&P Agent and prior Correctional Officer duty amounted to seven years, two months of
service. (G-24, G-41, T. I-pp. 154, 167.)
13.

Crawford selected Bassi, Benson, Bingham, Pepper and Richins as her

"comparables" for grieving "new hire" pay equity comparisons (Grvts. Exht. 24; T. I
pp. 174-75).
C Appellant Dale E. Hansen
14. Hansen began his employment with UDC in April 1975. Appellant Hansen
commenced as a Probation Aide, later advanced to an AP&P Technician, and still later he
received a promotion to Correctional Counselor at Grade 17.

Hansen served as a

Correctional Counselor from October 1979 through January 1986. During this time, he
advanced to Counselor, Grade 19. In 1986, Hansen received promotion to Correctional
Counselor, Grade 21, which was the top position in that career ladder series.

As

Agent Hansen had accrued six years and four months of counseling experience, this time
period was credited to his total service as being directly related AP&P Agent experience
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(Agency Exht. 3).
15. In January 1986, Hansen transferred from a Grade 21 Correctional Counselor
to a Grade 21 AP&P Agent, at his same pay rate. In March 1986, Hansen was promoted
to AP&P Agent, Grade 23. (T. I. 16-17; Agency Exht. 5.)
16. At the time of grievance filing (July 1990), Hansen had four years, six months
of AP&P Agent experience (Agency Exht. 3). Additionally, Agent Hansen also received
credit for his prior tenure (i.e., six years and four months) as a Correctional Counselor,
which brought his total credited AP&P service to ten years, ten months.2 In July 1990,
Hansen's pay rate was $12.473 per hour as a Grade 23 Agent. (Agency Exht. 3, 5.)
17. Hansen compared his AP&P Agent employment experience and pay rate with
those of newer Agents Bassi and Pepper. (G-l; T. I p. 19.)
D, Appellant Sherry Morgan
18. In 1966, Sherry Morgan began employment with the State • s Division of Family
Services in the former Department of Social Services (now Human Services) as a Social
Service Worker, Grade 17. In March 1973, Appellant Morgan transferred from Social
Services into an AP&P Agent position with UDC. As her Social Services• duties were not
directly related to AP&P duties, she received no credit for her prior State employment
(Agency Exhts. 3; T. I. p. 227).
19. From 1973 into 1977, Morgan advanced in the AP&P Agent career ladder series
from Grade 15 to Grade 23. In late 1977, Appellant Morgan resigned for personal reasons
(Agency Exht. 3; T. I p. 227).
20. In 1980, the Social Services Department re-hired Morgan as an Eligibility
Examiner, Grade 21, while placing her in an exempt or Schedule A position. The following
year Morgan worked as an Eligibility Technician, Grade 15, at a lesser pay rate but in a
Schedule B or career service position (Agency Exht. 3).
21. On May 30, 1981, Morgan transferred to an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position
with UDC's Field Operations Division. Effective May 29, 1982, Appellant Morgan was
promoted to an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, position, which position she continued to serve in
until her grievance filing (July 1990). (T. I pp. 227-28; Agency Exht. 3.)
22. At grievance filing, Morgan had 13 years, 10 months of directly related AP&P
Agent experience as credited by UDC (Agency Exht. 5). Agent Morgan credited herself
with only 13 years and 4 months of directly related AP&P Agent experience (Grvts.
-8-

Exht. 33). Morgan's pay rate at the grievance filing was $13.34 (Agency Exht. 5), although
Morgan erroneously stated her pay rate as $12.84 in her Summary Status document (Grvts.
Exht. 33).
23.

Agent Morgan selected comparables Bassi and Pepper for pay equity

comparisons.
E. Comparable William Brad Bassi
24. Bassi had been employed with the State's Juvenile Court from February 1975
until mid-May 1989. Bassi began his career as a Probation Aide, advanced through the
ranks as a Probation Officer from Grade 15 to 26, finally attaining supervisor status.
25. As a State employee, Bassi transferred into UDC initially and temporarily as a
Corrections Trainee, Grade 13, (essentially during his POST Academy certification training),
at which time he retained his higher Grade 26 Juvenile Court pay rate. After POST
certification, Bassi received placement at the AP&P Agent, Grade 23, level effective
August 19, 1989, again retaining his former Juvenile Court pay rate due to his lateral
transfer action from one State agency to another. (Agency Exht. 2; T. I pp. 206-07.)
26. Bassi was not a "new hire," but rather a State employee who had transferred
from one State jurisdiction to another while continuing his State service.
27. Bassi, with his 15 years • service as a State Juvenile Court Probation Officer, was
accepted and treated by UDC as a career service employee, not a probationary employee.
UDC accorded Bassi immediate recognition of his prior merit or tenured status with the
Juvenile Court (Agency Exht. 2; T. I pp. 206-07).
28. All three Appellants—Crawford, Hansen and Morgan—selected Bassi as a
comparable new hire for comparison purposes.
F. Comparable Ronald Benson
29. The Department hired Benson as a Correctional Supervisor, Grade 21 on
May 12, 1986. During October 1987, Benson's position was reclassified to a Security and
Enforcement Officer, Grade 21, with the same grade and pay rate (Agency Exht. 2).
30.

Effective April 16, 1988, Benson transferred from his Utah State Prison

assignment to an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position in UDC's Field Operations Division.
For his intra-departmental transfer, Benson received no pay increase (Agency Exht. 2; T. II
pp. 9, 11-12, 19, 21, 26). According to State policy R468-7-4.(7), Benson's lateral transfer
did not entitle him to a salary increase.
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31. Benson received a promotion to AP&P Agent, Grade 23, one year later, on
April 15, 1989.
32. Appellant Crawford selected Benson as a comparable for comparing her service
length and pay rate (Grvts. Exht. 24).
G. Comparable Kenneth Lee Bingham
33. Bingham was employed by the Department on April 2, 1988. As a new hire,
Bingham began as an AP&P Agent at Grade 19. Bingham advanced to AP&P Agent,
Grade 21, after completing a full year as a Grade 19. After a second full year, Bingham was
promoted to Grade 23 (Agency Exhts. 2, 4).
34. Upon leaving the Weber County Sheriff s Department, Bingham accepted a two
dollar per hour pay cut to join Field Operations as an AP&P Agent (T. I p. 137).
35. Bingham had been an AP&P Agent for over two years when Appellants filed
their grievances in July 1990. As of July 1990, Bingham's pay rate was $12.59 compared
with Crawford's lesser $11.23 per hour, a difference of $1.36 per hour (Agency Exht. 4, 5;
T. I pp. 124, 130).
36. The Department credited Bingham with approximately 14 years and 6 months •
law enforcement experience at the grievance filing. Bingham • s full service credit was based
upon a combination of law enforcement experience gained with the Weber County Sheriff' s
Office, U.S. Army military police duty, and his AP&P Agent service with Field Operations
(T. I. pp. 127, 130, 133; Grvts. Exht. 22; Agency Exht. 2).
37. Only Appellant Crawford selected Bingham as a comparable (Grvts. Exht. 24).
H. Comparable Scott Pepper
38. Pepper hired on as an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, effective December 23, 1989
(Grvts. Exht. 48). Pepper • s initial pay rate was $13.28. When the Crawford group grievance
was filed, Pepper's salary rate had increased to $13.81 per hour (Agency Exht. 2, 4).
39. The Department credited Agent Pepper with 16 1/2 years' directly related work
experience (with the Murray City Police Department) upon his hiring, and he had 17 years •
experience when the grievance filing commenced (Grvts. Exhts. 47, 48).
40.

Appellants Crawford, Hansen, and Morgan each selected Pepper as a

comparable for length of service and pay rate comparisons (Grvts. Exhts. 1, 24, 33).
41. As of July 1990, Pepper's 17 years' directly related job experience exceeded
Crawford's 7 years, 2 months; exceeded Hansen's 10 years, 10 months; and exceeded
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Morgan's 13 years, 10 months of directly related experience.
42. Correspondingly, at the time of the grievance filing, Pepper • s pay rate of $13.81
exceeded Crawford f s $11.23 by $2.58 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5).
43. Pepper • s pay rate of $13.81 at the grievance filing exceeded Hansen's $12.47
by $1.34 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5).
44. Pepper's pay rate of $13.81 at the grievance filing exceeded Morgan's $13.34
by a more narrow $0.47 per hour (Agency Exhts. 4, 5).
I, Comparable Randv Richins
45. UDC hired Richins on July 11, 1990, as an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, at the pay
rate of $12.17 per hour (Agency Exht. 2).
46. The Department credited Richins with 14 years, 8 months of directly related job
experience based upon his prior law enforcement experience (Grvts. Exhts. 46, 48).
47. Appellant Crawford selected Richins as a comparable for comparing her length
of service and pay rate (Grvts. Exht. 24).
48. Richins' pay rate of $12.17 at the grievance filing exceeded Crawford' s $11.23
by $0.94 (Agency Exhts. 4, 5).
J. Additional General Findings
49. In 1985, Gary W. DeLand became the executive director of the Department.
Director DeLand established policy that resulted in greater law enforcement training,
emphasis, and capabilities for certain staff, including AP&P Agents.
50. Director DeLand established a training academy within the Department that
provided more stringent law enforcement and correctional training leading to Category II
peace officer certification, in place of the former Category I training of prior years for
AP&P Agents.
51. To further emphasize the change to a higher level of peace officer standards
within the Department, Director DeLand directed that law enforcement training and
experience should be given equal weight with the more traditional AP&P roles of
supervision and counseling in the recruitment of new AP&P Agents.
52. Under Director DeLand, UDC's Field Operations Division created a new
program known as the Intensive Supervision Unit (ISU). DeLand directed his managers to
especially recruit new employees who had extensive law enforcement experience, particularly
from sheriffs• offices, local police departments, and from other law enforcement sources and
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agencies, to staff the ISU.
53. Some new recruits transferred into the ISU from other State agencies. Thus,
Bassi and Benson, for example, are transferees who retained their prior agencies • pay rates,
who continued their State employment as permanent employees with career service status,
and who were precluded from needing to serve another probationary period.
54. A few other newly hired agents had been recruited for AP&P duty in the ISU
due to their lengthy law enforcement experience.

Comparables Pepper, Richins and

Bingham each had extensive law enforcement experience. At the time of their respective
hirings, Pepper had 16 1/2 years» law enforcement experience; Richins had 14 years, 8
months; and Bingham had 14 years, 6 months.
55. Bingham and Richins had been hired as AP&P Agents at Grades 19 and 21,
while Pepper had been hired at Grade 23.
56. Appellants Crawford, Hansen and Morgan selected the following comparables
for their respective pay inequity comparisons (Grvts. Exhts. 1, 24, 33):

57.

Crawford

Hansen

Morgan

Bassi
Benson
Bingham
Pepper
Richins

Bassi

Bassi

Pepper

Pepper

Appellants Crawford, Hansen, and Morgan each selected Pepper as a

comparable. All four were at Grade 23 in July 1990. Appellantsf years of directly related
experience and salary rates at the grievance filing compare with Pepper' s, as follows:
Name

Experience
Salary Rates July 1990
(years and months)

Pepper
Morgan
Hansen

17-00
13-10
10-10

13.814
13.34
12.47

Crawford

07-02

11.23

58. A bachelor * s degree in law enforcement or criminal justice meets the State' s
educational requirement for AP&P Agent service along with a half-dozen other fields of
major study, or on a year-or-year work experience substitution (Grvts. Exhts. 12-15,45, 49).
Specified other designated "directly related experience" also qualifies new hires or
transferees for job experience in addition to law enforcement and criminal justice. Some
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of the original Grievants qualified for AP&P Agent placement based upon their directly
related experience such as counseling, correctional officer, jail duty, etc., as alternatives to
law enforcement experience.
59. Some individual AP&P Agents perform a lesser amount of law enforcement
duties, while others perform a greater amount (Grvts. Exht. 35, pp. 6-7; T. II, pp. 45). Thus,
some AP&P Agents perform more at the law enforcement end of a continuum; others
perform more at the social work/counseling end (T. II, pp. 62, 64 BAKSH; T. I, pp. 74-75
McDONALD; T. Ill, pp. 310-11 GILLESPIE).
60. State agency management, such as UDC officials, may determine how much or
how little directly related work experience may be credited to new hires for given job titles,
but must do so on a consistent, even-handed basis (T. I, pp. 73-75 McDONALD).
61. Appellant Morgan holds a bachelor of science degree in the directly related
academic field of sociology (Grvts. Exht. 33). Comparable Pepper received a bachelor of
science degree apparently in the nondirectly related field of international business (Grvts.
Exht. 42). Pepper" s prior law enforcement experience meets the DHRM Grade 23 AP&P
Agent classification specification. Pepper* s 17 years • directly related experience exceeds
Morgan • s 13 years, ten months • AP&P Agent experience. Pepper• s $0.47 per hour more
than Morgan • s pay rate is not unreasonable, violative of rule or law, improper nor arbitrary.
Pepper» s more than three yearsf directly related experience justifies his greater salary over
Morgan • s lesser pay rate.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Those terms used in the Utah State Personnel Management Act (USPMA) at
Utah Code Unannotated (1992 Supp.) §67-19-2, under the heading "Policy of state," such
as "comparative merit" (3), "fair treatment" (5), and so forth, are broad policy statements.
As broad policy statements of intent and purpose, they provide both guidance and
philosophic credence. However, as very general policy statements, they do not contain a
precise measurable gauge for assessing alleged violations of such terms as "merit
principles," "fairness" or "inequity." Because these terms are used in a very broad and
general context, they lack the specificity necessary to be self-executing.
2. Human Resource Management Rules, July 1, 1990, (hereinafter "DHRM Rules'1)
defines the personnel action of a transfer as: "Movement of an employee within an agency
or between agencies from one position to another position for which the employee qualifies,
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including a change of work location or organizational unit." (R468-1-1.)
3. DHRM R468-5-5.(4) states that career service employees of one jurisdiction or
merit system may transfer into another, including transferring into and between Utah's
executive branch departments, which would include UDC.
4. Bassi was placed in an AP&P Agent position by the Department under provision
of a lateral transfer. Substantial evidence shows that Bassi was accorded continuous State
employment from one merit system jurisdiction to another, specifically from the Juvenile
Court to UDC.
5. Both the pay rate and work experience comparisons between Crawford, Morgan
and Hansen with Bassif s as AP&P Agents are inappropriate and legally insupportable.
Bassi was not a "new hire" and his pay rate as an AP&P Agent, Grade 23, was, in fact, only
a continuation of his leaving pay rate from the Juvenile Court.
6. R468-7-4.(7) states: "Individuals may not be offered salary increases to leave one
position for another if the positions are of the same salary range whether in the same or a
different agency." While it may be asserted that DHRM Rules are not applicable or even
binding on judicial employees (R468-2-l.(l)), UDC treated Bassi as if he had already been
an executive branch career service employee and the Department properly applied
DHRM f s transfer provisions to Bassi • s employment circumstance. Thus, Bassi was not
offered a salary increase to join UDC, but merely retained his former jurisdiction • s leaving
pay rate upon entering AP&P service. No violation of rule or statute resulted.
7. Appellants' allegations of a pay rate inequity based upon Bassi' s "hiring rate"
are legally insupportable inasmuch as Bassi was accorded transfer status from the Juvenile
Court, not new employee status. Appellants• premise of Bassi as a "new hire" is based
upon a legally defective comparison, which precludes any measurement of similarly situated
employment comparisons.

Bassi's transfer status and pay rate fully complied with

DHRM • s transfer requirements. There was no violation of rule in setting Bassi• s starting
pay rate. It was neither unreasonable nor inappropriate to begin Bassi' s employment with
Field Operations by maintaining his Juvenile Courtf s leaving pay rate.
8. Benson clearly was not a "new hire." Agent Benson had been hired by UDC in
1986 as a Correctional Supervisor, Grade 21. Later, the Department reclassified Benson
as an Enforcement and Security Officer, also at Grade 21.

In April 1988, Benson

experienced an intra-departmental transfer into an AP&P Agent, Grade 21, position. The
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grieving of a personnel action occurring in 1988 on the grievance filing date of July 26,1990,
is untimely by Crawford (§67-19a-401(5)(a)). A grievance may only be filed within 20
working days from the event giving rise to the grievance, or within 20 working days from
knowledge of the event, but nevertheless, not more than one year after an event's
occurrence (§67-19a-405(5)(b)).
9. As Benson entered AP&P as an Agent, Grade 21, and the three Appellants were
all at Grade 23 upon their grievance filing, the comparison, particularly Crawford's, is
inappropriate. Appellants may only compare themselves with incumbents if they are in the
same position title (i.e., AP&P Agent) and at the same grade level (i.e., Grade 23).
Crawford • s comparison with Benson is fatally defective because she compared her Grade 23
status to his initial Grade 21 status. Not until one year after his AP&P Agent appointment
did Benson actually receive a promotion to Grade 23.
10. UDC treated Benson as an intra-departmental transfer; as such, he was accorded
all therightsand privileges of a career service employee who had been transferred pursuant
to DHRM' s R468-7-4.(7). Benson was not a new hire who began serving a probationary
period as an AP&P Agent; instead, Benson actually continued his accrued annual leave, sick
leave, career service^tatus, and all the other entitlements of an employee who had already
been vested with career service status. Crawford' s case against Benson is fatally flawed by
untimeliness and an inappropriate position comparison, thus by law must fail.
11. Crawford's comparison with Bingham's pay rate upon his being hired is
untimely (§67-19a-401(5)(a) and (b)).

Bingham was hired in 1988, and Crawford's

grievance not filed until two years and nearly four months later in 1990. By law, that
constitutes a fatally defective filing based upon an untimely event, which must result in
Crawford • s grievance being dismissed.
12. Bingham was first hired by UDC as an AP&P Agent, Grade 19. Crawford was
already at Grade 23. Crawford' s comparison to Bingham is inappropriate due to differing
position levels and salary grades. During a two year period (1988-90), Bingham received
two promotions, first to Grade 21 then to Grade 23. These two promotions substantially
increased Bingham' s pay rate over his initial hiring rate of $10.37. But for Bingham' s two
promotions subsequent to his hiring, his pay rate at the grievance filing ($12.59) would not
likely have exceeded Crawford's by $1.36 per hour as it did.
13. The Department was justified in setting Bingham's starting pay rate at $10.37
--K.

due to his 14 years' prior law enforcement experience.
14. Pepper's 17 years' directly related law enforcement experience reasonably
justifies his higher pay rate of $13.81 over each of the Appellants' lesser rates. Based upon
Pepper's greater law enforcement service length, his higher pay rate of $13.28 upon entry
to AP&P Agent service was neither arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, nor an abuse of
discretion. Moreover, the record evidence does not support any claim to a violation of
either a personnel rule or a statutory provision,
15. Prior to July 1, 1990, DHRM's R468-7-3.(2) stated:
Individuals will typically be hired at the minimum of the
approved range. However, agencies have full responsibility and
authority to hire up to the midpoint of the approved range.
The department head is responsible for providing funding and
for preventing inequities as determined by agency management.
Effective July 1, 1990, DHRM's R468-7-3.(2) was amended to read:
Individuals will typically be hired at the minimum pay of the
approved range. However, agencies have full responsibility and
authority at their discretion to hire up to midpoint of the
approved range. Hiring above the minimum of the range shall
not be used as justification to increase the salary of current
encumbents [sic] except where approved market data supports
such increases. (Emphasis supplied to amended wording.)
16. The amended language of R468-7-3.(2), effective July 1, 1990, eliminated the
specific responsibility of the department head for "preventing inequities as determined by
agency management."

The "anti-inequity" proscription was eliminated prior to the

grievance filing on July 26, 1990.
17. Claims arising out of the "anti-inequity" rule prior to July 1, 1990, may include
proven economic losses. However, any alleged losses would have to be quantified and
limited to back pay and accompanying benefits, not general psychological damages nor
speculative considerations having an impact only on future prospects.
-18. -Appellants shoulder the burden of proof. The evidentiary standard is substantial
evidence (§67-19a-406(2)).
19. The three Appellants must be able to identify specific new hires whose starting
pay rate differentials relative to theirs cannot be objectively justified.
20. Department officials did not act in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, nor did they violate any administrative rule or statue when crediting the
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comparables for their prior law enforcement experience upon their being hired or
transferred into AP&P Agent positions. To credit the comparables for their actual law
enforcement experience fell within the acceptable ambit of management prerogative.
21. All three Appellants selected Bassi as a comparable. Crawford also selected
Benson as a comparable. Both Bassi and Benson were current State employees who had
transferred from one State agency to another. Bassi and Benson retained their prior
individual pay rates after being transferred. By neither increasing nor decreasing Bassi' s
and Benson' s pay rates, the Department complied with DHRM' s R468-7-4.(7) (Transfers).
Therefore, Bassi and Benson are not appropriate comparables for any of the three
Appellants.
22. All three Appellants, Crawford, Hansen and Morgan, selected Pepper as a
comparable. At the grievance filing, Pepper had 17 years' directly related experience
compared with Crawford' s 7 years and 2 months; Hansen' s 10 years and 10 months; and
Morgan' s 13 years and 10 months. Pepper' s more extensive directly related experience
adequately justifies his higher pay rate. Given Pepper' s greater directly related work
experience, the difference in pay rates is reasonable and rational.
23. CrawforcTalso selected Richins as a comparable. Richins was hired on July 11,
1990, subsequent to the elimination of the so-called "anti-inequity" portion of the preJuly 1, 1990 version of R468-7-3.(2).
24. Crawford • s selection of Richins for wage comparison was inappropriate because
Crawford was then positioned on Grade 23 while Richins was hired on Grade 21.
Furthermore, Richins had 14 years, 8 months of directly related work experience, while
Crawford had less than half as much with 7 years, 2 months. In light of Richins • greater
directly related work experience (including law enforcement), no inequity existed between
Richins' and Crawford' s pay rates at the grievance filing.
25.

Crawford also selected Bingham as a comparable.

This comparison is

inappropriate because Crawford was on Grade 23, while Bingham was hired at a Grade 21.
Additionally, Bingham had 14 years, 6 months of directly related experience at his hiring as
compared with Crawford's 7 years, 2 months' experience.

Therefore, Crawford's

comparison to Bingham is acutely flawed.
26. It properly falls within the managerial prerogative of agency management to
determine relevant qualifications for agency assignments and staffing, including the
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qualifications and criteria appropriate to recruiting and selecting AP&P Agents so long as
such qualifications are reasonable and rational. Pursuant to DHRM' s classification system
and its promulgated classification specifications, State agencies, including UDC, may assess
applications for filling positions.
27. UDC complied with DHRM' s classification system and recruiting strictures. It
was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for Director DeLand to place prior law
enforcement experience on a par with prior AP&P Agent experience, or even other types
of relevant correctional experience, including counseling.
28. UDC considered, evaluated, and credited educational background for purposes
of qualifying persons to meet DHRM's "minimum qualifications'1 (MQs) for AP&P Agent
positions. The Department was not required by law (neither by statutory provision nor
administrative rule), or by UDC' s own policies and procedures, to credit equally years of
educational experience along with directly related work experience for purposes of salary
setting. The three Appellants have not shown a violation of any statutory provision,
administrative rule or promulgated policy or procedure in the comparables • hiring process.
Appellants have failed to meet their burden of showing any direct, actionable, unreasonable,
or unjustified inequity, including any personnel rule violation, even with timeliness questions
aside.
29. The hiring of Bingham, Pepper and Richins, along with the transfers of Bassi and
Benson, did not create pay inequities for Appellants Crawford, Hansen or Morgan.
Consequently, their appeals must fail and be denied.
30. The three Appellants1 claims of pay rate inequities anent any or all the
comparables, are not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, Appellants • complaints are
determined to be without merit, and their grievances fail for reason of not meeting their
burden of proof by showing that they have been directly harmed by the Department • s
employment practices (§67-19a-403(2)(a)(iii)), or that they have been subjected to any
personnel rule-violation.regarding applicable salary provisions.
31. The Department's acceptance of certified law enforcement experience for
placing "new hires" above the entry pay rates and/or up to the midpoint was accomplished
in conformity with both DHRM's Rules and DHRM f s General Classified State Pay Plan.
Furthermore, that acceptance was not an unreasonable exercise of managerial discretion.
The Department is entitled to some reasonable discretion in assessing the type of experience
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most applicable to hiring AP&P Agents as long as such discretion does not violate DHRM's
Rules nor evidence inconsistent or unequal treatment within a department • s work force.
32. The Departments officials did not act inappropriately, unlawfully or
unreasonably in determining that directly related law enforcement experience may be used
as a substantial factor in setting individual salary rates of newly hired AP&P Agents.
33. The State's, i.e., DHRM's, classification specifications for AP&P Agents at
Grades 17, 19, 21 and 23 (Grvts. Exhts. 12-15) along with other documentary evidence
(Grvts. Exhts. 2, 35,45 and 49) constitute more than sufficient substantial evidence to show
that law enforcement experience or law enforcement education, or a combination of both,
are acceptable in meeting minimum qualifications (MQs) for AP&P Agent entry
requirements.
34. The Department relied upon directly related experience, not education, in setting
newly hired AP&P Agents • individual pay rates. This practice conforms with DHRMf s
rules and policy, and is neither a violation of law nor an abuse of discretion under the facts
and circumstances of this case.
35. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Pepper • s greater salary rate is not
unwarranted vis-a-vis Morgan • s slightly lesser pay rate given his more than three years of
directly related experience over Morganf s total directly related experience.
36. Pursuant to R137-1-21 D. 2., the Board concludes as a matter of law that its
hearing officer correctly applied the relevant policies, rules and statutes. Furthermore, the
Board concludes that the Step 5 Decision is both reasonable and rational based upon the
totality of its factual findings and the record evidence as a whole.
DISCUSSION
A. Merit System Terms Within the USPMA
Appellants aver that the Step 5 Decision errs by failing to interpret certain USPMA
terms consistent with some of its overall policy provisions. Crawford, Hansen and Morgan
claim that the following evidentiary paragraph contains reversible error:
The Hearing Officer concluded in the Hansen case and applies
the same conclusion to the Crawford case that general language
in State law and Department of Human Resource Management
(DHRM) rules promising a personnel system based upon
"merit principles" and manifesting "fairness" and eschewing
"discrimination," while valid as statements of policy and intent,
do not comprise enforceable rules of managerial conduct (Ibid.,
_1Q_

p. 2)
Appellants are referring to the following twofold provisions at §67-19-2:
(3) It is the policy of this state that comparative merit or
achievement governs the selection and advancement of
employees in Utah State government and that employees be
rewarded for performance in a manner that will encourage
excellence and strengthen the system. (Appellants • emphasis.)
***

(6) It is the policy of this state to insure its employees
opportunities for satisfying careers and fair treatment based on
the value of each employee9 s services. (Appellants • emphasis.)
Appellants maintain that the Hearing Officer erred by holding that the above-quoted
provisions are "statements of policy and intent," but are not self-executing or enforceable
rules of managerial conduct. By the Hearing Officer • s so holding, Appellants also posit
that the trier of fact was "predispos[ed] toward favoring management in this particular
grievance" (Brief, pp. 6-7).
Appellants appear to read the above statutory provisions according to the way in
which they desire to have them read, rather than giving these words their plain meaning as
the Legislature intended (§68-3-11). For example, each of the seven subsections under §6719-2 begins, "It is the policy of this state . . ." (emphasis supplied). The CSRB Hearing
Officer neither stated nor implied that merit system principles are inapplicable to grievance
hearings. Rather, the CSRB examiner simply stated that these provisions do not comprise
enforceable rules per se, but constitute broad policy statements. Analogously, in this
tribunal' s most recent decision we made the following statement about these same statutory
provisions and terms: "These, of course, are broad policy statements rather than explicit
legal provisions."

(Sylvia Thompson v. Utah Department of Employment Security,

5 CSRB/H.O. 43 (1993), p. 20.) The introductory statutory phrasing so affirms in each
instance. Moreover, the record of the entire Step 5 proceedings for both the Crawford and
Hansen cases evidences many instances where the Hearing Officer allowed all Grievants to
amend their grievance statements, to search out "comparables" of their choosing not
previously designated in their grievance statements, to disregard strict time lines, to reject
several motions to dismiss on various grounds (some of which may have been proper
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grounds), and to allow Grievants their opportunity for a fair hearing despite some
procedural and jurisdictional elements working against Grievants. In consequence, the
Board concludes as a matter of law that the Hearing Officer did not commit reversible error
regarding any USPMA provisions under §67-19-2 as alleged by Appellants. Nor does the
entire case record show any predisposition to Agency management.
B. Law Enforcement Experience as AP&P Agent Experience
According to Appellants, "The Hearing Officer • s analysis appears to confuse the
issue of meeting minimum qualifications for the Adult Probation and Parole position with
the issue of what are equitable salaries for persons occupying an Adult Probation and
[P]arole position," (Brief, p. 8). The three Appellants as well as the other 17 Grievants
claimed that their job duties comprise only ten to twenty percent law enforcement duties.
Therefore, argue Appellants, the newer comparables as AP&P Agents should not receive
credit for their prior years of law enforcement experience, otherwise salary inequities arise.
In Finding number 58, we found substantial evidence showing that law enforcement
experience qualified as one of many types of directly related experience for AP&P Agent
service as set forth on DHRM' s classification specifications. Although directly related law
enforcement experience justified above-entry level pay rates for the comparables, many of
the Grievants also received credit for other types of directly related qualifying work
experiences for being counselors, correctional officers, and county jailers, etc. The DHRM
classification specifications for AP&P Agents, Grades 17-23, provided a variety of directly
related work experiences that benefitted many of the original 20 Grievants with additional
years of service beyond just their AP&P Agent years • service. Bartell received credit for
his prior Correctional Officer and his Enforcement Officer service. Crawford received credit
for her Salt Lake County jailer tenure. Hansen received credit for his prior half-way house
Counselor years.
Most of the original 20 Grievants defined their pure law enforcement duties as
consisting-of-between only ten to twenty percent of their overall AP&P Agent duties. In
contrast, comparables Bingham, Pepper and Richins, each of who had over 14 years • police
experience, placed their law enforcement duties as AP&P Agents at 70-80 percent or more.
They even viewed the non-ISU agents as performing at least 40-50 percent law enforcement
duties. Human Resource Directors McDonald and Baksh spoke in terms of more social
work/counseling at one end of the AP&P Agent spectrum and almost pure police work at
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the other end. Yet all are AP&P Agents whose particular duties and assignments may range
up or down the continuum as assignments change from time to time. The evidence in the
record docs not support Appellants' argument that the Hearing Officer erred in
determining that law enforcement experience was not directly related AP&P Agent work.
The weight of the evidence, in fact, supports the opposite finding.
The Board concludes, as a matter of law, that law enforcement experience and its
qualifying variants as found on DHRM 's class specs, such as police science, criminal justice
and correctional supervision, directly relate to AP&P Agent duties and may be considered
for assessing prior experience, and hence for setting pay rates of newly hired agents.
C. Assessing Status of Transferees
Appellants • third issue is that the Hearing Officer erred by refusing to compare the
Appellants' pay rates with those of Bassi and Benson. The latter comparables transferred
into AP&P Agent service, one from Juvenile Court and the other from within UDC's
Institutional Operations Division to the Field Operations Division.

As shown in

Conclusions, above, numbers 2-10, Bassi • s and Benson • s entry pay rates into AP&P Agent
status were governed by DHRM's R468-1-1 (-Transfer"), R468-5-5.(4) and R468-7-4.(7).
Accordingly, neither Bassi nor Benson received pay rate increases upon their being
transferred into Field Operations to AP&P Agent positions. The proper administrative rules
were fully complied with and no violations occurred. Therefore, Appellants' complaint
regarding any impropriety as to Bassi' s or Benson' s pay rate status is moot. Appellants
err in asserting that a "transferee [should] not be treated differently than a private applicant
for the position" (Brief, p. 14). Instead, transferees are entitled to those rights as set forth
in DHRM's Rules (1990) at R468-5-4.(3) - 4) and -5-5.
D. Alleged Pay Rate Inequities: Crawford and Pepper
Appellants maintain that the Step 5 Decision erred in limiting the pay rate
comparisons between Appellants and the comparables solely to work experience and not to
education also. The decision below concluded that if Morgan' s 13 years, 10 months' work
experience was added cumulatively to her four years spent in obtaining a directly related
bachelor's degree in sociology, her cumulative total would be greater than comparable
Pepper's 17 years' directly related experience, where no cumulative total included a
bachelor' s degree in a related field. In that light, the Hearing Officer opined that:
That one differential of $0.47 per hour does not seem sufficient
.??-

to refute the management decision that education be used as a
minimum requirement for entry and that salaries be based on
directly related experience, Grievants having been credited for
experience in counselling and other activities in addition to
probation and parole supervision. (Page 5.)
The Board agrees with Appellant Morgan that a $0.47 per hour difference would not be
de minimis absent any justification for the difference. Albeit the Hearing Officer' s analysis
is correct, and no salary inequity exists between Morganf s and Pepper ' s pay rates. The
trier of fact concluded that in UDC only directly related experience applies to adjusting new
hires • entry pay rates-exclusive of years spent in getting an education, advanced degrees,
or other credentials, etc. Human resource management officials McDonald, McGowan and
Baksh each testified that only directly related work experience is used in setting initial pay
rates, not educational attainments. Educational years are applied only against the minimum
qualifications for each job title • s classification specification. The Hearing Officer noted that
once an applicant had met the position's educational prerequisite, then education was not
used again as a management tool or criterion for setting salary ("does not seem sufficient
to refute the management decision that education be used as a minimum requirement for
entry and that salaries be based on directly-related experience . . . " ) . In sum, the Step 5
Decision held that Morgan may not add her four years for a college degree to her 13 years,
10 months' work experience and thus surpass Pepper• s 17 years' work experience. We
agree. Pepper ' s higher salary rate is reasonable, justifiable, not violative of rule or law, nor
an abuse of discretion.
Finally, to raise any issue in 1990 at grievance filing regarding the salary freezes of
FY1986-88 is untimely. Matters such as these are governed by the administrative rules
applicable at the contemporary time period.
DECISION
Appellant Crawford's

pay equity comparison with Benson fails because:

(1) Benson's entry into Field Operations and AP&P Agent service was through an intradepartmental lateral transfer, and (2) Benson began as a Grade 21 Agent while Crawford
held the higher level of Agent, Grade 23—an inappropriate comparison, and (3), the event
giving rise to the grievance (Benson' s pay rate at transfer) was untimely filed.
Ms. Crawford's salary equity comparison with Bingham is fatally defective because:
(1) the event giving rise to the grievance, i.e., Bingham's hiring, is untimely given that the
-23-

hiring occurred in April 1988 and the grievance filing in July 1990, (2) Bingham was
originally hired as an Agent, Grade 19, while Crawford held the higher level of Agent,
Grade 23, making an improper comparison, and (3) Bingham had twice as many years of
directly related experience as Crawford.
Agent Crawford' s comparison with Richins is impermissible and defective be mse:
(1) Richins was hired after the DHRM provision at R468-7-3.(2) was amended on ^uly 1,
1990, when the department director's former obligation to prevent salary "inequities"
under the so-called "anti-inequity" proscription was removed, and (2) Richins, upon his
hiring, had twice as much directly related experience as Crawford.
The comparison cases of Crawford, Hansen and Morgan with Bassi are wholly
defective because Bassi was accepted into Field Operations and AP&P Agent duty through
an inter-jurisdictional, merit system transfer of a State employee from one State agency to
another, at no pay increase, but with retention of tenure and career service status.
Finally, the comparisons of Crawford, Hansen and Morgan with Pepper are defective
because Pepper had been properly credited with more years of directly related experience
than each Appellant.
Based upon the entire record evidence, Appellants appeal must be denied with the
Step 5 Decision being affirmed.

There is no appropriate remedy to the Appellants1

grievances.
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DECISION UNANIMOUS.
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman
Jean M. Bishop, Member
David M. Hilbig, Member
Jose L. Trujillo, Member
DATED this

1

fy

day of August 1993

miceTTft
Chairman
Career Service Review Board

ENDNOTES
1. Grievant Dale E. Hansen in the UPEA case is not to be confused with grievant Michael Hansen in the
AFSCME (Hansen) companion case.
2. The Step 5 Decision assigned Hansen with ten years seven months total directly-related AP&P Agent
experience (Table 1, p. 4). However, Agency Exht. 3 shows the Department crediting Agent Hansen with ten
years ten months directly-related experience.
3. Hansen testified that his July 1990 pay rate was $12.33 per hour (T. I p. 18), and so stated and affirmed in
his Summary Status document (Grvt. Exht. 1). Nevertheless, that figure is in error; Hansen's actual pay rate was
$12.47 as shown on Agency Exht. 5, an individual departmental computer-generated salary history on Hansen.
4. Pepper's salary rate upon being hired on December 23,1989, was $13.28; as of July 1,1990, his pay rate had
increased to $13.81. During the Step 5 proceedings most, if not all, pay rate comparisons between all the
Grievants and comparables were measured from the date of the grievancefiling—July26, 1990.

RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code
Unannoiated §63-46b-13.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated
§63-46b-14 and -16.
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DHRM Bulletin

0HRM-90-012

Effective Date:

7-1-90

Rdbtncr

SUBJECT:

Hiring Up To Mid-Point
of Salary Range

Pi^t 1

Rule
R468-7-3

of

1

State agencies are authorized to pay salaries up to the midpoint of the appropriate pay range for newly hired employees if
market conditions require such action. However, such decisions are
net to be used to create internal salary inequities with otber
employees wnich become rationale for subsecuent requests to DHRM
for approval of special inequity salary adjustments.
Departments are advised that inequities are created wnen a
newly hired employee Is paid more than a current incumbent(a)
unless such pay differential is justified because of one of the
following r%msonm:
1.

Higher educational credentials

2*

More total
position

3.

Low performance ratings that may have restricted the oay
level of the current emoloyee(s)

employment

experience

applicable

to

the

In t&+ event of a department decision to hire an individual
above £ft*H£r*nt 0*y r*t* o f incumbents which creates a pay equity
conditiaSptpartments are required to auomit requests for special
salary ijppetaents for current employees with appropriate
explanations to OKRM to resolve Inequities.
Potential Inequities are to be identified, etudied ana
resolved before being created. All funding for special sa'ary
inequity adjustments is done within base budgets of departments.

tment of i M i n Resource Management

CSRB
Grievant
August 8, 1990

JXJ

Suzanne Dandoy, M.D., M.P.H.
Executive Director
Department of Health
BUILDING MAIL
Dear Suzanne:
I am writing in response to your memo to me dated July 27, 1990 concerning salary
grievances in the Division of Environaental Health. It Is ny policy to respond
officially to agency requests for special salary or inequity adjustments vhen
they have been subnitted from the Department Director, or where the Division
Directors have been delegated authority to sake such requests in behalf of the
Department. DHRM should not be In a position of finalizing an action with
Division Directors vhen the Department Director has not yet had the opportunity
to approve the Division request. Yet, ve vill always strive to be a resource
in discussing potential solutions to Issues MM part of the preliminary
considerations.
You have asked that I address the questions that you have raised in your memo
to Engineers and Environmental Scientists, dated July 27, 1990. As I do so, I
will reference the attached memo from Dick McDonald dated April 2, 1990.
Health Question 1 The definition of an inequity is an injustice or unfairness
MM it relates to employees' compensation. An inequity as it relates to salaries
of employees In the same classification would be evidenced by different salaries
paid to different employees when other variables are the semi or equal.
Variables to consider MTM education, experience, hire dates/rates, performance
ratings, merit increase amounts, etc.
Dick McDonald's memo of April 2, states. In regards to what might Justify special
salary adjustment: "New hire employees are hired at a salary rate equal to or
above those of current employees, In the same job classification.•
It would appear that the situation in Environmental Health be such aa inequity
if there are no specific justifications for differential pMy.

Health Quest lV.. 2
TH^April 2nd memo pn
o u s l y mentioned references
circumstances which do fl££ Justify a special adjustment:
-Employees are paid
different salary rates in the sane c l a s s i f i c a t i o n pay range because of different
hire dates, performance racings, and tenure. - I b e l i e v e agency administrators
select employees for promotion on the basis of such factors MM performance,
competence, s u i t a b i l i t y for the new position, tenure, e t c . Employees who are
promoted are s e l e c t e d and rewarded for the above named f a c t o r s . The amount of
promotion, MM you know, i s optional at agency d i s c r e t i o n within parameters given
in DHRH rules. I b e l i e v e administrators look at the current salary rates of a l l
other employees i n the same c l a s s i f i c a t i o n before they determine the percent
increase for those to be promoted into that c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Decisions are then
made to promote over, equal to, or below the r a t e s o f current employees. All
three options are the decision of the agency administrator and are generally
made to avoid creating inequities or morale problems.
Health Question 3
Employees do not have an ^ e n t i t l e m e n t - to any pay increase,
except COLA's d i c t a t e d by the Legislature. Agency administrators control their
budgets and reward employees within current DHRM r u l e s and guidelines. However,
agencies have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to be c o n s i s t e n t in their treatment of
employees. In instances of Identified i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s , there may, in fact, be
unfair or unjust treatment.
It i s up to the agency to research a l l the facts surrounding claimed inequities,
and forward requests for special adjustments to DHRM when the agency i s convinced
that a situation of unfairness e x i s t s . S p e c i f i c a l l y answering your question,
Environmental Health promoted certain employees t o a higher pay rate than others.
I don't know i f t h i s s i t u a t i o n that has been created by Environmental Health may
have resulted in an inequity or i f there are j u s t i f i a b l e reasons for different
pay as I have not reviewed the detail of each employee involved.
The factors to be considered in determining who should have their salaries raised
have previously been i d e n t i f i e d . Comparisons should be made i n i t i a l l y within
a work unit for comparable j o b s , but some review should be made for comparable
jobs throughout the entire agency in order to be as consistent and fair MS
possible in the treatment of a l l employees.
Hpelth Question 4
Inequitie# don't j u s t happen when employees are promoted.
Inequities are created either intentionally or through oversight when salary
Increases are authorized by agency o f f i c i a l s . The way t o minimize inequities
i s simply a careful review of a l l pertinent data each time a MMIMTJ Increase
decision i s made.
Adherence to consistent I n t e r n a l hiring and promotional
practices should v i r t u a l l y eliminate a l l i n e q u i t i e s . Prevention i s always better
than cure.
In summary, promotions should £&£ create I n e q u i t i e s with employees vho are
currently in the MMMM c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and salary l e v e l . The salary range for the
specific c l a s s i f i c a t i o n represents equity for a l l who *r« performing the
d u t i e s / r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in that c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . The a c n « ; i alary on the range
i s dependent on a great number of variables. The v « r U M « » Justify different
salary rates for people in the BMIMM c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and »• : »ry range. Only when
the variables are the same, but salaries are d i f f e r e n t , 6o«* an inequity e x i s t .

P*fTA ^

1

^

£.v*n roougn ^ r o w a n t a l f l l a l e h did not raquast( W* inpucTafora tha o r i g i n a l
promotional pay dacialona vara aada, va subsaquantly aat a t l a a a t t v i c a v l t h
thaa to mddr^MB chair problaaa.
Va v i l l ba happy now to ravlav and raapond t o vhatavar tha Haalth Dapartaant
dmMirmm to submit for tha l d a n t l f l a d lnaquitlaa.
I f tha j u a t l f l c a t l o n and
docuaantatlon aubaittad ia aupportiva of granting soaa a p a c i a l
salary
adjustaants, than DHRM v i l l approva than. DHRM v i l l ba happy t o f u r t h a r d i s c u s s
any lssuas nov or aftar your formal raquast.
Slncaraly,

Earl J Bannar, Exacutiva Dlractor
Dapartaant of Human Rasourca Managaaant

EJB/RRM/J1
cc:

Robart Vhlta
Bob Hayvood
Dick KcDonald
John Mathavs
Nancy Sechrest - UPEA

7.

Special Silinr Adluatacnti
Centrally, special aalary adjuatments are only approvtd by DHSH when
an inequity can clearly be demonetrated.
Uaually a significant
ertnt happens or circumstances occur which cauaes the Inequity*
Some examples are:
1.

frobationary
employees
MTB allowed a probationary
BMIMTY
Increase which may move the* to an equal or hisher salary levtl
than othtr more atnior employeee in the ease Job classification*

2.

Hew hire employees are hired at a salary rate equal to or above
those of current employees, in the same Job claaalflcatlon.

3. Imployees are not; given
proawted or reclassified,
classification.

the sane percent
when they are in

Increase when
the saae Job

4. Adminietrative or clerical errors In personnel actions In the
area of salary amounts, effective dates, etc.
3.

Preferential treatment of one eaployee over another employee.

Circumstances which do not; justify a special aalary adjustment
1.

Employees are paid different
salary
rates
in the
aame
classification pay range because of
different hire datea,
performance ratings, and tenors*

2.

Outstanding or exceptional Job performance.

3.

Catch-up pay increases because of salary freeze years.

4.

Different
levels
classification.

of

educational

attainments

in

same

Job

5. Any performance factore used for Justification.
6.

Surplus funds available to help employees.

7.

A supervisor who is paid less than a eubordinata employee.

t.

Increeses In duties and responsibilities.

All requests for special sslary adjustments, or equity adjustments should
bs made in writing according to the above Justifications.
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THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In The Matter Of:
JOHN H. JONES,

DECISION

Grievant and Respondent,

AND
ORDER

v.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY,
Agency and Appellant.

Case Nos. 10 CSRB/H.O. 137 (Step 5)
4 CSRB 38 (Step 6)

The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level
review of the above-captioned case on May 28, 1992. The following Board members were
present at the hearing for consideration of oral argument and deliberation: Chairman
Bruce T. Jones, Jean M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig and Jose L. Trujillo.

John H. Jones

(Agent Jones and Grievant) was present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at
Law, on behalf of the Utah Public Employees' Association (UPEA). The Department of
Public Safety (Department and DPS) was represented by Lin D. Miller, Jr., Personnel
Manager for the Department. A certified court reporter made a verbatim record of the oral
argument during this proceeding, which is commonly referred to as a Step 6 appeal hearing
under the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, Utah Code Unannotated, (1991 Supplement),
§67-19a-101 etseq.
I. AUTHORITY
The Board's authority is found at §§67-19a-101 through -407 of the Utah statutes.
The CSRB's regulatory provisions or administrative rules are published in the Utah
Administrative Code at R137-1-11 etseq. (1992), and in the Board's Grievance and Appeal
Procedures Manual (1989 edition).

This case has proceeded properly through the State • s grievance procedures, and the
Board has assumed jurisdiction over the Department's appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or
Board-level review constitutes the final step in the administrative review process under the
codified Grievance and Appeal Procedures, pursuant to §67-19a-202(l)(a), and -407, as well
as constituting a final agency action under §63-46b-14 of the Utali Administrative Procedures
Act (UAPA). Following oral argument, the Board closed the record and entered into
deliberation and decision-making.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Replies to Grievance at Steps 2 and 3
On June 7, 1991, Agent Jones submitted his written statement of grievance to his
immediate supervisor, Captain Stuart Smith, bureau chief of the UDI's Narcotics
Enforcement Bureau. Captain Smith acknowledged that the other staff recently assigned
to the UDI were to receive salary adjustments (i.e., pay increases) effective July 1, 1990.
However, the bureau chief wrote to Grievant that Grievant had "signed a letter stating you
agree to no 5% salary adjustment." The captain also stated that he did not know how
Agent Jones "fit into this new pay plan in respect to the other agents you referfred] to in
your grievance"; albeit, Captain Smith stated a willingness to review Grievant' s salary status
as of July 1,1991, "If you still feel you have a pay inequity, I will be happy to review it with
you at that time." Nevertheless, Bureau Chief Smith denied Agent Jones' grievance in the
Step 2 reply.
Next, Grievant advanced his salary complaint to his division director at Step 3. UDI
Division Director Fred Schwendiman offered Jones the following explanation as to why the
latter had not received a salary increase upon transferring into the UDI in late summer,
1990:
It is my understanding that when you transferred to UDI some
time ago into the Auto Theft Program that you were given a
5% salary adjustment as part of the career mobility assignment.
When you subsequently were returned to duty with the Utah
Highway Patrol, your salary was not changed and you were
allowed to continue with the increase you had [rv ;ved] while
in UDI. When you then were again re-assigned : » UDI, the
decision was that it would be inappropriate to adt' .: other 5%
for the new career mobility assignment.
UDI Director Schwendiman concluded that to give Grievant miv. additional 5% and back
pay as requested in [Jones'] grievance would be inappropriate .mil something I could not
.9-

support."

Hence, Schwendiman denied Jones • grievance at Step 3 of the grievance

procedures.

P, Tfre First Administrative Hearing and Decision, or Phase I
Upon advancing his grievance to the Step 4 or department head level, Grievant was
offered an administrative hearing, which occurred on July 30, 1991- The trier of fact was
the Departments administrative law judge (AU). This first administrative hearing at the
departmental level later became known as "Phase I," due to a second proceeding later on.
The ALJ's Phase I decision stated UDI f s position for denying Agent Jones grievance:
The Division admitted that the seven other Troopers received
the five percent salary adjustment when they accepted their
career mobility transfers [into the Division of Investigations].
The Division argued that Jones did not receive the five percent
salary adjustment because he had received a nine percent salary
adjustment in 1984 when he moved into a temporary dual
assignment involving the Governor • s Protective Services Unit
and the UHP Vehicle Theft Program. The Division contended
that to give Jones a five percent increase in 1990 in addition to
his nine percent increase in 1984 would be excessive and would
create internal problems with other employees.
Furthermore, the Division argued that it was untimely for Jones to raise his grievance
on June 7, 1991, when he had already accepted a career mobility transfer into the UDI on
September 5, 1990.2

The ALT agreed with the UDI's untimeliness argument and

concluded his Phase I decision by recommending that the department head should dismiss
the grievance "for the reason that it was not pursued in a timely fashion." Importantly, the
ALJ acknowledged that Agent Jones* grievance may have been filed timely at Step 1
(verbal discussion with the immediate supervisor), but that Grievant had failed to process
it in a timely fashion thereafter.

As this administrative hearing decision was a

"Recommended Step 4 Decision," the matter was next considered by Commissioner
D. Douglas Bodrero, the DPS department head.
Commissioner Bodrero declined to rule on Agent Jones • grievance from the narrowly
technical ground that the grievance had not been timely advanced and processed. Instead,
the commissioner wrote that he was taking a broader perspective of Agent Jones' informal
problem solving efforts. As the commissioner stated in his August 21, 1991 Step 4 reply:
[I]t has been the position of this administration that oftentimes
avenues are available to resolve differences short of the official
grievance process. The fact that you pursued these avenues

prior to initiating an official grievance do[es] not compel me to
rule against you because of this delay.
Thereupon, the Commissioner remanded the case to the ALJ for the latter, "to gather
evidence in order to make a recommendation to me concerning this matter." Essentially,
Commissioner Bodrero expressed his preference to make a decision based upon the merits,
issues and facts of the case, and not upon "a technicality as to when the grievance was
initiated." Hence, any further allegations of untimeliness in either the filing of this
grievance or its processing were effectively waived by the DPS commissioner himself*
C. The Second Departmental Hearing and Decision, or Phase II
Upon remand, the Department • s ALI met with both parties• representatives on
September 11, 1991, at which time the representatives received a list of eight questions to
be answered and returned to the ALJ. After receiving each party • s replies, the ALJ issued
his Phase II Recommended Decision on October31, 1991. Therein, the A U ' s Phase II
Recommended Step 4 Decision reached an ultimate decision, as follows:
It is respectfully recommended that Agent Jones • grievance be
denied for the reason that the Division had a valid reason for
denying him the five percent salary adjustment when he
accepted the career mobility assignment to UDI on
September 5, 1990. However, it is also recommended that the
Department give Agent Jones the option of rescinding the
career mobility agreement with UDI and allow him to return to
his prior field assignment in the Utah Highway Patrol.
The basis upon which the Department• s A U denied Agent Jones • grievance for a five
percent pay increase upon appointment to the UDI was that the Division' s representative
had averred that Grievant's assignment to Executive Protection in 1984 had been a
temporary assignment, that it had been for only five months,3 and that Grievant was the
only person of 27 individuals assigned, since July 1,1969, to have been assigned to Executive
Protection on a "temporary" basis. Concluded the AU:
Thus, the notion that the officers who worked in the Governor • s Protective
Services Unit retained their nine percent salary adjustments even after leaving
the Unit is a myth. This is particularly true in the case of officers who served
there less than 18 months.
In his Phase II decision, the Department's ALJ recommended that the DPS
Commissioner should deny Agent Jones• a five percent salary increase for his assignment
to the UDI in 1990, but that Jones should again be given the alternative of rescinding his
-4-

career mobility agreement with the UDI and be allowed to return to the UHP as a field
trooper, if he chose,
D. The Step 5/Evidentiarv Proceeding and Decision
On January 16, 1992, the CSRB hearing officer conducted an evidentiary hearing at
the Step 5 level of the State Employees • Grievance and Appeal Procedures.

This

proceeding is a new hearing for the record, conducted de novo, with both parties being
granted full administrative due process. The Board • s hearing officer is required to give
"latitude and consideration" to an agency • s prior decision when the latter is supported by
findings of fact based upon the evidence adduced below.4 Most importantly, the CSRB's
factfinder is not required to give any deference to the Department • s factual findings where
the departmental hearings were not conducted as formal adjudications under the UAPA (see
Utah Code Unannotated, £63-46b-l(2)(e)).
The Step 5/evidentiary determination issued on February 6, 1992, reached an
ultimate conclusion favoring Grievant: that Agent Jones had sufficiently met his burden of
proof with substantial evidence; that he was entitled to prevail in his June 7, 1991,
grievance; and that he should be awarded back pay retroactive to his appointment date as
a Law Enforcement Agent I.
One matter requires preliminary attention and resolution before analyzing the factual
findings and legal conclusions from the Step 5 proceeding below. Even with Commissioner
Bodrero's August 21, 1991 letter stating that he would decide this case on its merits, the
Departmentf s representative has advanced an untimeliness claim at both the Step 5 and
Step 6 proceedings. Therefore, after setting forth the issues below, we must consider the
timeliness controversy due to its jurisdictional nature.
III. ISSUES
A. Agent Jones' Statement of Grievance and Remedy.
Agent Jones filed a statement of grievance on June 7, 1991. Therein, Grievant
claimed that he had been denied a five percent salary increase upon his being voluntarily
transferred through a career exchange program5 from the position of trooper in the Utah
Highway Patrol (UHP) into the Department's Utah Division of Investigations (UDI) as a
Law Enforcement Agent I, effective September 5, 1990. Agent Jones averred that he had
been promised a five percent pay adjustment along with seven other UHP troopers who had
also been assigned to UDI • s Narcotics Enforcement Bureau under the same career mobility

program. Each of the other seven troopers received a four to five percent pay increase6
upon assignment to the UDI, except Agent Jones. The UDI director, Fred C. Schwendiman,
stated to Agent Jones that the reason he was not being given the special five percent pay
adjustment along with the new career mobility assignment was that Jones had previously
been granted a similar five percent salary increase for a prior transfer into the UDIf s Auto
Theft Program 'some time ago." (Grievant Exhibit 4.)
Grievant's remedy to his pay inequity complaint was that he be given a five percent
salary adjustment retroactive to August 18,1990, or at least that he be given a pay increase
equal to that awarded to each of the other seven UHP troopers who had received the same
career mobility assignment of Law Enforcement Agent I as had Jones.
B. Issues Adjudicated at the Step 5/Evidentiarv Proceeding
The issues under adjudication at the Step 5 hearing were set forth in the notice of
hearing, as follows:
1. Is the Grievant entitled to prevail on his June 7, 1991 salary
grievance?
2. If so, what is the appropriate remedy?
The CSRB hearing officer ruled in favor of the Grievant. The Board • s trier of fact
concluded that, "[t]here is more than substantial evidence to support the Grievant • s case;
and therefore, he is entitled to prevail in his grievance of June 7,1991." Consequently, the
CSRB hearing officer directed the Department *to retroactively apply the five percent pay
increase to the Grievant • s Grade 23 pay as of the first pay period subsequent to the date
of his appointment as a Law Enforcement Agent I."
C. The Board * s Standards of Review
R137-1-21 D sets forth the Board's scope of review and its standards of review as
follows:
Standards of Review The boardf s decision shall be based upon
the following:
1. The board's appellate decisions shall be supported by
credible substantial evidence.
2. The board's standards of review consist of determining:
(a) whether the hearing officer• s evidentiary decision was
supported by substantial evidence; (b) whether that decision is
warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal;
_*_

and (c) whether the hearing officer's findings of fact and
conclusions of law are correct and accurate based upon the
evidence in the record.
D. Burden of Proof
The Department is the party appealing the Step 5/evidentiary decision to \

Board

at Step 6, and therefore shoulders the burden of proof based upon the CSRBf s ab

-stated

standards of review. DPS claims that Grievant failed to meet his burden c

ostantial

evidence at the Step 5 proceeding; that the CSRB hearing officer failed to make inclusions
of law as required by statute and rule; that the CSRB hearing officer made errors in factual
findings numbers 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 23; that the evidentiary trier made opinions incorrectly
labeled as conclusions of law; and that the hearing officer erred in his conclusions of law
at numbers 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18 and 19. We review first the correctness of the factual
findings and their reasonableness. Next, the Board may either accept and adopt the hearing
officer• s factualfindings,correct thosefindings,or enter its own findings. Then we review
the Step 5 record as a whole with no deference to determine whether the hearing officer
correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes. Finally, we examine the Step 5
decision in relation to the Department • s decision and in light of the hearing officerf s
ultimate conclusion and decision, and his application of any policies, rules, and statutes
affecting this grievance.
IV. TIMELINESS CHALLENGE
In his August 21, 1991 letter to Agent Jones, Commissioner Bodrero noted that the
departmental A U had recommended that this grievance should "be dismissed on the basis
that it was not pursued in a timely fashion" (Agency Exhibit 7).

Nevertheless, the

department head observed that Agent Jc tes had pursued his grievance through unofficial
avenues short of the official grievance process. By Grievant having pursued his complaint
through unofficial, problem-solving avenues, Commissioner Bodrero stated that he would
not rule against Jones because of delay in the processing of this grievance. Thereupon, the
department head remanded Jones• grievance to the ALJ to have him:
reconvene the departmental hearing in order to gather further
evidence making a recommendation to the commission of the
grievance' s merits. It is my desire to resolve this issue based
on fairness supported by facts, not on a technicality as to when
the grievance was initiated. (Emphasis supplied.)
Consonant with Commissioner Bodrero's instruction above, the Department's A U
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conducted a second hearing, in which the merits of the grievance were considered and ruled
upon, with the timeliness issue having been put aside or mooted.

The ALI's

•Recommended Step 4 Decision (Phase II)" was issued on October 31, 1991. The
departmental factfinder recommended to the department head that Jones' grievance be
denied "for the reason that the Division had a valid reason for denying him the five percent
salary adjustment when he accepted the career mobility assignment to UDI on September 5,
1990." On November 5, 1991, Commissioner Bodrero wrote to Grievant that his salary
adjustment request was being denied, but that Jones could rescind his career mobility
transfer to the UDI, if he wished.
Grievant's UPEA representative advanced the grievance to Step 5. Thereupon, the
Department's representative submitted a "Request For Administrative Review Pursuant
to §67-19a-403," which was a further attempt to reassert the same timeliness issue previously
settled in favor of the Grievant by the DPS commissioner.

In response, the CSRB

administrator denied the Department's attempt to raise anew the previously settled
timeliness question which now constituted a stale challenge to the allegation of Grievant' s
untimely status.7
The Department' s representative further raised the timeliness issue at Step 5, this
time directly with the CSRB hearing officer (T. 5-6, 77-78, 81-82, 94). On this issue the
CSRB hearing officer made a specific finding in his Finding of Fact number 30. The
evidentiary trier quoted from Commissioner Bodrero's August 21, 1991 letter (Agency
Exhibit 7), wherein the latter wrote that due to Grievant' s dependence on informal avenues
of problem-solving, the commissioner had decided he would not rule against Agent Jones
because of any time delay. Stated the CSRB trier of fact: "Commissioner Bodrero then
remanded the case to the ALJ for consideration on the basis of 'fairness supported by
facts,' rather than a technicality as to timeliness." In Conclusion of Law number 3, the
CSRB hearing officer concluded in part: "On the issue of timeliness, which the Agency
raised again in the course of this hearing, the disallowance of that issue by Commissioner
Bodrero, ordering the grievance to be reheard on the basis of its merits, makes that question
moot. There is no reason to believe that Commissioner Bodrero did not have the authority
to do so." Moreover, the hearing officer cited to the department head's reliance on the
Department's standing practice of settling grievances informally, by which the "past
practice" principle was invoked in this instance.
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Following the CSRB • s Step 5 evidentiary proceeding and decision, the Department • s
representative has again raised the timeliness question that should have been disposed of
conclusively at Steps 4 and 5. In the Departmentf s JBlifif to the Board, at pages 8-9, the
Department argues that because the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing in the State's grievance
procedure is a de novo proceeding, an untimeliness assertion may again be applied in an
effort to defeat the Step 5 Decision's determination.
We now conclude with finality that as a matter of law the Public Safety
commissioner's August 21,1991 letter constitutes a valid waiver of any and all untimeliness
claims and defenses on the part of the Department (see Agency Exhibit 7). That letter
constitutes an express relinquishment of the legal right to invoke any procedural or
jurisdictional claims to any questionable timeliness acts on Agent Jones' part anent this
grievance.

An essential component of a valid and legal waiver is the element of

unconditional voluntariness. Agency Exhibit 7 contains this core requirement; that exhibit
contains a full and unconditional expression of voluntariness. Hence, the commissioner's
August 21 letter is dispositive to any question of timeliness in this grievance matter; he
knowingly, deliberately and intelligently waived the timeliness issue in futurity. There is no
showing that any of Commissioner Bodrero' s subordinates have authority to overturn his
decisions with respect to grievances. By Utah law, a department head's decision is final at
the departmental or Step 4 level of the grievance procedures (§67-19a-402(4)(c)).
V. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
John Jones was hired by the Department of Public Safety on April 16, 1973, and
began serving as a UHP trooper (T.13). Trooper Jones was appointed to the position of the
UHP's Auto Theft Coordinator (Coordinator) sometime during May or June 1984, while
still holding the rank of Trooper II (T. 36,37, 38-39). This appointment was a special UHP
Headquarters assignment. Grievant's special appointment was then interrupted shortly
afterwards when he was transferred on August 4, 1984, through a career mobility
assignment, to the Executive Protection Detail (aka Governor • s Security). Grievant had
not received any pay increase for his special assignment to the Coordinator position, but he
did receive a nine percent salary increase upon being transferred to Governor' s Security
(Grievant Exhibit 1).
Agent Jones served in Executive Protection until about October 15,1984, depending
upon whether Jones' or his former supervisor's version is accepted (T. 71-73)- The
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Departments Personnel Action Form shows Jones' transition to Executive Protection as
a Temporary assignment until 12/31/84" (Agency Exhibit 4). Nevertheless, Grievant
stated that he was not aware of nor informed about the temporary nature of this assignment
during his term of service with Executive Protection (T. 83-84). The UHP superintendent's
July 27, 1984 letter which appointed Jones stated only that, "In the event you should leave
this new assignment, your pay will be adjusted to the position, grade and step level you
would have attained had you not served in Executive Protection." A computer generated
"salary action history" form of recent origin shows Jones' salary increased by nine percent
from $12.12 to $13.21 effective August 4, 1984, although he remained on the Trooper II pay
grade 21 level (Grievant Exhibit 1). According to the official paperwork, Grievant was not
transferred out of Governor's Security until July 1, 1985, (Grievant Exhibit 1) although in
reality his transfer occurred the previous October.
When Grievant left the Executive Protection Detail in mid or late October 1984,
management directed his return to UHP Headquarters in continuation of his prior special
assignment, that of Auto Theft Coordinator. The action history does not show an exact date
of his return to Headquarters as Coordinator. Grievant' s salary was neither reduced nor
changed upon his reassignment to Headquarters in October 1984 (T. 26), nor in later
months. Importantly, Jones' nine percent pay increase was retained upon his leaving
Executive Protection, and was never taken from him. A Department witness testified that
Grievant was permitted to retain his nine percent salary adjustment because Jones had
"returned to a position that warranted the additional increase in money, so rather than take
it away from him they let him keep that increase." (T. 58).
Agent Jones remained in his Coordinator assignment for the next three years, which
lasted from October 1984 through December 1987 (T. 26). Jones' Coordinator assignment
ended in December 1987, when that program was phased out (T. 38).
Grievant's next assignment originated through a letter dated December 18, 1987, in
which the UHP superintendent informed Trooper Jones that he was being reassigned
effective December 26, 1987, to the Department's Medicaid Fraud Bureau, through an
interdivisional transfer (T. 26-27, 31, 38-39; Agency Exhibit 1; Grievant Exhibit 6). Jones»
new assignment was effectuated through a career mobility agreement (a written contract),
signed later on January 26, 1988 (Grievant Exhibit 6). This agreement placed Grievant in
the Department' s Investigations Division as a Fraud Medicaid Bureau Investigator (T. 39).
-10-

The agreement stated that Jones• temporary assignment to the Medicaid Fraud Bureau as
an Investigator would expire December 31, 1989, unless rescinded sooner. Agent Jones
retained his rank of UHP Trooper II, at salary grade 21, while serving as an Investigator.
(T. 40, Grievant Exhibit 1). There was no change in either Jonesf salary grade or pay rate
during this temporary duty with the Medicaid Fraud Bureau (Agency Exhibit 1; Grievant
Exhibit 6). Both parties acknowledge that Jones retained the nine percent salary increase
that he had received since August 1984 upon his temporary assignment to Executive
Protection*
In February 1988, however, Grievant was again reassigned by management: this time
from the Medicaid Fraud Bureau to the Special Investigations Bureau, both within the UDI
(T. 42-43). Although the salary action history document on Agent Jones does not show the
exact date of his being reassigned back to field trooper status with the UHP, he placed the
period as some time during July or August of 1988 (T. 43). The Department' s salary action
history omits this personnel move. Grievant performed field trooper duties for the next two
years during which time his salary was not decreased even though he was no longer
performing any special assignments for the first time since May or June 1984. In sum,
Grievant had been serving on special assignments, career mobility assignments, and
temporary duty assignments from May/June 1984 through August 1988, when he returned
after a more than four year hiatus to UHP field trooper status. Agent Jones then served
as a UHP trooper out of the Murray office until selected for the UDI Law Enforcement
Agent I position during August/September 1990 (T. 44-45).
In May 1990, the Departments UDI internally advertized and recruited for eight
Law Enforcement Agent I positions. These eight i gent I positions with UDI were
announced as being available to current DPS employees through a two year career mobility
assignment/transfer. Ultimately, all eight UDI Agent I positions were filled by the selection
of UHP troopers (T. 14). All eight troopers were initially told that they would receive pay
increases of four to five percent for the job change (T.16; Grievant Exhibit 3). Grievant,
who was one of the eight UHP troopers selected for a UDI Law Enforcement Agent I
position, expected and was told initially by Captain Wendell that he would receive a five
percent pay adjustment. All the selected troopers, except for Agent Jones, received a 4-5
percent salary increase as part of their career mobility assignment with UDI's Narcotics
Enforcement Bureau.
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Effective August 18, 1990, Grievant was reclassified from Highway Patrol Trooper
IIf at pay grade 21, to Law Enforcement Agent I, at pay grade 23 (Grievant Exhibit 1). In
contradiction, however, the UHP superintendent released Grievant from his UHP status and
directed him to a UDI training assignment effective September 10, 1990.

(Agency

Exhibit 3.) Concomitantly, an executed but undated Career Mobility Agreement transferred
Jones from the UHP Division to the Investigations Division (Agency Exhibit 2), In further
contradiction, the salary action history shows Grievant being transferred on July 1, 1990,
presumably from the UHP, and being reclassified on August 18, 1990, as a Law
Enforcement Agent I. Essentially, Agent Jones received a pay grade advancement from
grade 21 to 23 but without any accompanying salary increase, which salary adjustment had
been granted to the other seven troopers/agents for the same assignment.
Initially, the justification relied upon by the Department• s officials to withhold from
Jones' a five percent pay increase was that set forth in a letter dated August 22, 1990, by
UHP Lieutenant Colonel Gary E. Gunrud to UDI director Fred C. Schwendiman which
stated:
In the interest of fairness and equity, I recommend that
Troopier Jones not be given the five percent increase since he
has been making sergeants [sic] wages ever since serving as the
Auto Theft Coordinator for the Patrol (Grievant Exhibit 3).
Subsequently, Agent Jones and UDI Director Schwendiman mutually signed a career
mobility agreement pertaining to the UDI Agent I position. The document offered into the
record does not contain an authorized date of execution (Agency Exhibit 2). This written
agreement was to be in effect "until September 1, 1992[,] unless sooner rescinded."
UDI Director Schwendiman later offered another view as to why Agent Jones was
not given a five percent salary increase like the other seven troopers who were also
appointed to fill the Narcotics Enforcement Bureau • s Agent I positions. In his June 24,
1991 Step 3 reply to Agent Jones1 grievance, Director Schwendiman stated:
It is my understanding that when you transferred to UDI some
time ago into the Auto Theft Program that you were given a
5% salary adjustment. When y< < ^ ibsequently returned to duty
with the Utah Highway Patrol, ymr salary was not changed and
you were allowed to continue \tiih the increase you had while
in UDI. When you then were again re-assigned to UDI, the
decision was that it would be inappropriate to add another 5%
for the new career mobility assignment (Grievant Exhibit 4).
(Emphasis supplied.)
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Yet another justification was argued by the Department at the evidentiary/Step 5
hearing for not offering Jones • a salary increase at the beginning his two-year stint with the
Narcotics Enforcement Bureau. The Department maintained that Jones should have had
his salary reduced five percent when Grievant left UDI 's Fraud Medicaid and retu; zd to
field trooper duties in 1988 (T. 91). The Department now claimed that it was rem s and
in error not to have reduced Jones • salary at that time. This error was described as the
Department's "slip through the crack/ its "failfure] to take the money away," "an
oversight," "our fault that it wasn' t taken away when it should have been taken away."
(T. 92, passim.) Thus, in response to Agent Jones1 grievance, the Department claims to
have acted fairly to both Jones and the other seven troopers/agents by not granting Agent
Jones the same five percent pay increase that had been granted to the other seven similarly
situated troopers/agents8 during the August-September 1990 period (T.91). The action
history (Grievant Exhibit 1) does not show that Jones was ever given a five percent pay
increase especially for the Coordinator position, but he was granted nine percent for
commencing duty with Executive Protection in August 1984. That nine percent was not
taken away or reduced by four percent for his retention of even five percent for the special
assignment as Coordinator. The Department• s position was that the special assignment
position of Coordinator warranted a five percent pay increase referred to as "temporary
sergeant's pay"9 (Agency Exhibits 3 and 5). At hearing, the Department argued that
Jones' salary should have been reduced [whether by nine, five or four percent is unstated
and unclear] upon his returning to field trooper duties in July/August 1988 (T.91-92;
Grievant Exhibit 4).
VII. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The Department posits that because Agent Jones failed to submit any documentary
evidence showing that he was entitled to a special salary adjustment, therefore, Jones was
not inappropriately denied a special salary adjustment. Additionally, the Department avers
that Jones did not even call any witnesses to support his case.
By law, the burden of proof is the substantial evidence standard (Utah Code
Unannotated, £67-19a-406(2)(c)). In a salary grievance, such as this matter, the burden of
proof is upon the grievant (Utah Code Unannotated, £67-19a-406(2)(b)). A paramount legal
authority defines substantial evidence as applicable to agency administrative proceedings,
as follows:
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Under the substantial evidence rule, as applied in
administrative proceedings; all evidence is competent and may
be considered, regardless of its source and nature, if it is the
kind of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion. In other words, the competency of
evidence for purposes of administrative agency adjudicatory
proceedings is made to rest upon the logical persuasiveness of
such evidence to the reasonable mind in using it to support a
conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla and means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Chrysler Corp. v. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. C.A.. 631 F.21d 865.890.203
U.S.App.D.C. 283. quoted from Black's Law Dictionary, sixth
edition, p. 1428.
First we review to determine whether the record below contains sufficient, credible
evidence which a reasonable mind would accept to draw a conclusion therefrom. Next, we
review to ascertain whetherthe record contains more than a mere scintilla to support the
hearing officer• s ultimate conclusion.
In his Conclusion of Law number 1, the hearing officer correctly placed the burden
of proof upon Grievant, and properly set the evidentiary standard at the substantial evidence
level. DPS states that Grievant called no witnesses, other than himself, although Grievant
testified for 43 1/2 pages out of 65 1/2 total pages of testimony. The Department' s two
witnesses testified for a total of 22 pages in the transcript. Grievant submitted seven
exhibits, the Agency also submitted seven exhibits, and one joint exhibit was filed. The total
exhibits numbered 15 documents. The record testimony and exhibits constituted more than
a sufficiency for substantial evidence.
The Step 5 record shows that the hearing officer properly developed "a clear and
complete record," received "relevant evidence," and admitted evidence that had "a
reasonable and probative value," as required in the CSRB' s rules (R137-1-20 A. 1, 6). As
a matter of law we conclude that the combined testimony and documentary records are
more than sufficient to constitute credible substantial evidence, which satisfies the statutory
requirement (§67-19a-406(2)(c).
The hearing officer considered, analyzed and wo

<I the testimonial and

documentary evidence before him. He found it sufficient for Uic Grievant to meet his
burden of proof, and we affirm the adequacy of the Grievant's evidence. The hearing
officer relied upon the entire record of the Step 5 proceeding, meaning that he took into
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account both the Grievant • s and the Department • s evidence. The factfinder ultimately
concluded that he had found "more than substantial evidence to support Grievant f s
case

"

(Step 5 Decision, p. 12).

Applying the Board1 s appellate standard at

R137-1-21 D. 1, we hold the CSRB hearing officer made reasonable and rational factual
findings. The Step 5 Decision is found to be warranted by the facts and circumstances in
accordance with the substantial evidence standard. The findings by a factfinder must be
entitled to a presumption of correctness. The Department has not mustered sufficient
justification to overturn that presumption on appeal. Overall, there is sufficient credible
substantial evidence that a reasonable mind would accept to support the Step 5 Decision,
even though other reasonable minds may differ with the ultimate decision.
VIIL STEP 5 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Department faults the Step 5 Conclusions of Law. This challenge is directed to
the point that only four (or possibly five) conclusions are in reference to any of the State! s
human resource management rules. Except for conclusions 8, 13, and 19 (and possibly
number 16 by inference) referring to R468-2-5(2)(f), the Department believes all other
conclusions are defective due to not citing a particular administrative rule (Brief, pp. 5-6).
Conclusions Of law are not merely recitings of rules and statutes. Legal conclusions
include propositions that are made after the factfinding process occurs. We agree with the
Grievant ! s statement that written opinions (i.e., propositions) are acceptable forms of
conclusions of law, and that while the correctness of any conclusion may be attacked, that
the process per se is beyond challenge.
After examining the Step 5 Decision's Conclusions of Law, we hold that the CSRB
hearing officer correctly placed the burden of proof on the Grievant (§67-19a-406(2)(b)),
correctly applied the substantial evidence standard (§67-19a-406(2)(c)), correctly concluded
that the department head waived the timeliness issues arising at Step 4, and reasonably and
rationally ruled on the merits of Agent Jones• grievance. Admittedly, the trier of fact found
several pieces of information to be "unclear" based on the adduced testimony and
documentary evidence that he considered. Our scrutiny of the documentary record and
testimony confirms that several aspects pertaining to Grievantf s past salary history are not
clear. The Board further holds that the evidentiary/Step 5 decision is legally supportable
based on the evidence in the record as a whole.
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DC APPELLATE CONCLUSIONS
Based upon the evidentiary/Step 5 Findings of Fact and the evidence in the record
as a whole, this administrative tribunal makes the following Conclusions of Law:
1. The department head at Step 4 waived all issues regarding timeliness in both the
filing and processing of this grievance. That issue became moot at Step 4.
2. The Board enters the same factual findings as those made by the CSRB hearing
officer, and hereby adopts those evidentiary/Step 5 Findings of Fact as its own.
3. The evidentiary/Step 5 Findings of Fact are supported by credible substantial
evidence in the record. There is sufficient substantial evidence to support the hearing
officers findings, conclusions, and ultimate decision,
4. The Department did not have a legally valid reason to preclude Agent Jones from
receiving his five percent special adjustment for serving in the UDI, when all the facts and
circumstances are considered.
5. The Board concludes as a matter of law that the Department made an erroneous
decision that precluded a special pay increase for Agent Jones. The Department is
obligated to treat all similarly situated employees alike, unless there is a reasonable or
rational purpose in making an exception. In the instant case, no rules or statutes precluded
Agent Jones from receiving the special pay adjustment that was granted to the other seven
selected troopers for UDI service,
6. The Department • s officials did not properly communicate with Agent Jones that
it intended him not to continue receiving his nine percent pay increase granted in 1984, and
which he continued to receive after August 1988, even after all of his series of special
assignments ended.

The Department could have corrected its acknowledged error

(T. 11, 92-93) regarding Grievant's salary rate during or within a reasonable time after
August 1988. Failure to correct Jones • salary proximate to the time it could or should have
been corrected forfeited the Departmentf s discretion to come back two years later and take
it away by not granting the same increase given to the seven other similarly situated
employees. DHRM's R468-2-3 (1990) bestows upon agencies the ability and authority to
correct administrative errors (as noted by the hearing officer); however, this rule may not
be enforced arbitrarily to correct errors that could have or sh<» < I have been corrected years
earlier. It would be an arbitrary act to attempt to correct •

/ matters two years, five

years, or 12 years after the fact. Administrative errors, incl.

: Grievant's salary rate,

_K

must be corrected within a reasonable time. Two years after the fact is not a reasonable
exercise of managerial discretion.
7. This grievance is not about a situation of mutual mistake. As the Department
failed to communicate with the Grievant regarding its error in 1988, it waived any ability
to take away salary from Agent Jones in 1990 even by not granting him the five percent
received by the other seven troopers/agents.

We conclude that the Department has

discretion to give salary increases or not; however, that discretion must be exercised within
reasonable bounds. There has to be a reasonable basis for salary decisions. The facts of
this case do not comport with a reasonable basis. Jones should have received his pay
increase in 1990 for the same appointment given to the other seven troopers. With
discretion comes responsibility. In the instant fact setting, the Department has forfeited the
right to withhold Jones • pay increase by basing its actions upon incidents that occurred well
over two years previously, and to some extent even six years earlier.
8. Grievant was treated in an impermissible manner that constitutes disparate (i.e.,
completely dissimilar) treatment.

All eight UHP troopers, including Grievant, were

advanced from pay Grade 21 to pay Grade 23. Trooper John Grabner (and by inference
the other six troopers) was advanced from Grade 21 to 23 under the aegis of a "career
mobility" move and thus received a special pay adjustment (Grievant Exhibit 2). Grievant,
in contrast, was advanced from Grade 21 to 23 but not given the pay increase awarded to
the other seven troopers, and the personnel action noted was that of "reclassification." By
stating a "reclassification," the Department is treating Agent Jones is a dissimilar fashion
when he was a part of the same similarly situated group of UHP troopers. The pretext of
"reclassification" is an arbitrary exercise of authority, in this instance.

It is further

concluded that the appellation of "reclassification" to Agent Jones • career mobility move
(Grievant Exhibit 6) is entirely inappropriate, and constitutes an artificial attempt to
segregate him from his similarly situated peer group.
9. On its face, this salary difference in the treatment accorded Jones and the seven
other similarly situated troopers/agents constitutes an impermissible, unfair employment
practice within the State• s civil service system. Jones was not treated fairly nor equitably
vis-a-vis the other troopers/agents when he was advanced to Grade 23 without receiving the
pay rate increase awarded to his seven UHP peers.
10. The Board concludes that the evidentiary/Step 5 decision is reasonable and
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rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and the correct application of relevant
policies, rules, and statutes applicable to this grievance- The Department's appeal is
denied.
X. DECISION
The Department's appeal to the appellate/Step 6 level is denied. Agent Jones is
entitled to the remedy award by the Step 5 Decision. It is so ordered.
DECISION UNANIMOUS.
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman
Jean M. Bishop, Member
David M. Hilbig, Member
Jose L. Trujillo, Member
DATED this2T^day of July 1992.

J3nic^-4-7-dones
Chairnu
Career Service^Revte^ Board

RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21 J and Utah Code
Unannotated §63-46b-13.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated
§63-46b-14.
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ENDNOTES
1. Beginning in January 1992, the Utah Division of Administrative Rulemaking renum*
rulemaking number from R140 to R137. Currently the CSRB is still using its 1989 edi
Procedures which applies the R140 number. I fowever, the 1992 edition of the Utah Adi
issued in April 1992, and therefore we shall hereinafter use the R137 designation wh
code set.

cd the CSRB's agcr
Manual of Gricvar
strativc Code has be
s found in the newi

2. In the ALTs Phase I Finding of Facts, factual findings Nos. 5 through 15 treat the r ter of Jones' long del
in filing his salary adjustment grievance. Given the later Step 4 decision and the subsequent sequence of even
it is not pertinent to treat this aspect in detail in the main body of this Step 6 Decision.
3. The Division/Department representative stated that Agent Jones had served in Executive Protection for fi
months, while Grievant himself testified that the lime period was about three and one-half months.
4. Effective December 16, 1991, the CSRB changed the wording of R137-1-20 C. from "latitude and deferenc
to "latitude and consideration." See Utah Admin. Code R137-1-20 C. (1992 Supp.)
5. The Human Resource Management Rules (July 1,1990 cd.) published by the Department of Human Resour
Management (DHRM) at R468-5-15.(6) recognize two types of career exchange programs. The career exchanj
program applicable to Agent Jones' grievance is defined as follows:
(6)(a) Career mobility involves employee movement from one job to another,
which shall require a written contract between the employee and the
appropriate department officials.
6. Both of the Step 4 or departmental level decisions by the DPS ALI stated that the seven other troopers/agen
received a five percent increase. In contrast, though, the Department's representative at the Step 5 hearii
stipulated that all of the other seven troopers/agents received "a four to five percent salary adjustment" (T. 16
However, each connection between Jones' name and the anticipated salary adjustment was always expressed
terms of being a five percent increase. This Step 6 Decision associates Jones' name with the much-discussed fii
percent adjustment figure, not four percent.
7. The CSRB administrator's December 3, 1991 ruling stated the following pertinent reasoning for denying tl
Department's resurrected claim of untimeliness by Grievant:
The Administrator of the Career Service Review Board holds that the issue
of timeliness is moot because the department head waived the issue of
untimeliness raised by the Department's administrative law judge (ALI) in the
latter's Recommended Decision [Phase I]. The department head,
Commissioner D. Douglas Bodrero, remanded \gent Jones' grievance to the
Department's ALJ for further proceedings on the record at the Step 4 level
for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the grievance. Subsequently, the
Department's ALI issued a second determination on Agent Jones' grievance.
The Step 4 proceeding and decision dealt with the grievance's merits,
following which the department head issued a decision on the merits of the
grievance. Hence, since the department head waived the issue of any alleged
untimeliness, there is no such issue before the Administrator to review. As the
department head knowingly and deliberately waived the issue of timeliness at
Step 4, to now have the Department representative attempt to raise that issue
again or anew may suggest bad faith in dealing with this grievance.
In my opinion, the grievance is justiciable at Step 5 before the Board's
appointed hearing officer; therefore, the request is denied.
8. The Department produced no showing of evidence to substantiate its claim that a five percent pay adjustmen
to Agent Jones would somehow create internal salary problems with the other seven trooper/agents oi
other identified UHP troopers. Certainly no salary data was submitted on this point.
.1Q.

9. At various times during the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing the Department explained that a trooper who accepted
a special assignment, thereby receiving a special pay adjustment, received "sergeant's wages." (T. 48, 63,69, and
83-84.) This term seems misleading. For example, a Highway Patrol Trooper I is classified at Grade 19; a
UHP Trooper II is paid at Grade 21 level; and a UHP Sergeant is classified at pay Grade 25. Each grade level
(also called a salary range per R468-1-1) has an entry rate, a midpoint rate, and a maximum rate; and beyond
the latter one may advance in pay only through meeting longevity criteria in order to exceed the maximum rate
on a given grade/range. During the period of years in which the Slate has been using this open range system
for the Classified Pay Plan, employees' individual pay rates may vary anywhere on a given salary range from the
entry point to the maximum rate, or beyond for longevity. Hence it is an erroneous figure of speech to speak
in terms of troopers receiving "sergeant's wages." Troopers arc either on Grade 19 or 21 (Grade 23 is not
presently being used), while sergeants are on the higher Grade 25 level. (See, for example, Grvt. Exh. 1, 2;
Agency Exh. 4, 5.)
A trooper with many more years of service may be earning more pay by being further along the
trooper's salary range (Grade 19 or 21) than a newer sergeant who has less years with the UHP. Literally, it
is a misnomer, then, to speak in terms of a trooper earning "sergeant's wages." At best, this simply means that
a trooper is receiving a temporary salary increase for appointment to a special assignment, not that the trooper
is on the grade/range of sergeants at Grade 25. Importantly, even the Department's own personnel expert
(Rac Callin) did not know whether Jones was being paid extra as the Auto Theft Coordinator because he was
doing the duties of a sergeant (including supervision), or because he warranted extra pay for occupying that
position as a special assignment (T. 65). The hearing officer observed that even though Grievant continued to
receive his August 4, 1984 special pay adjustment (i. c., so-called "sergeant's wages") while serving in the
Coordinator position, he appears to have done so in a nonsupcrvisory capacity (Step 5 Conclusion number 9).
Some confusion is also manifest in this grievance by the Department's suggesting that if Grievant were
to receive the same five percent awarded to the other seven selected troopers/agents that such a situation would
create a pay inequity problem between Jones and the other seven troopers. This is a specious argument which
attempts to blanket the Department's previous error in not restoring Jones' salary when his special assignments
ended in 1988. As a Trooper II with 17 years' UHP experience, Jones is quite likely to have a salary rate in
excess of most troopers more recently hired than himself. Also, it matters not that Jones' pay rate is below, at,
or above the pay rate of a particular trooper, sergeant, lieutenant, or captain. What matters is whether Jones
is being paid properly on his assigned grade/rangc-cither at a Grade 21 pay rate as a Trooper II or at Grade 23
pay rate for a Law Enforcement Agent I, depending on which level he is classified according to his assigned
duties at a given time. Comparison with the same or other job titles and other salary histories on other
grades/ranges is not the proper comparison. Jones needs to be given proper credit for his length of service, his
prior promotions, his prior merit/productivity increases, and any other variables directly affecting his particular
pay rate as presently classified.
The State expects that merit and achievement will determine the advancement of its employees, and
that employees will be properly rewarded with a salary and benefits that encourages excellence amidst a fair
employment system (§67-19-2(3)). To hold Jones unfairly to his Grade 21 Trooper II pay rate while
concomitantly placing him at the duties and responsibilities of a Grade 23, when the other seven troopers
received a five percent increase for their advancement to Grade 23 but which he did not, is not an acceptable
merit system practice. Such unfairness and disparate treatment require redress for Agent Jones.
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